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RECENT DECISIONS
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-EMPLOYEE'S ACCEPTANCE OF PARTIAL AwARDs UNDER
STATE COBPENSATION ACT AS BAR TO REMEDY UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIADILITY
Ac.-Plaintiff was injured while working as a hostler atop one of defendant's
locomotives. A claim was made under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law
and a series of partial awards were made to the plaintiff amounting to $2,729.02
which the defendant paid through its insurance carrier. Before a final award of the
Compensation Board was made plaintiff discontinued his claim without prejudice
and brought suit for injuries under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. The
District Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the
complaint on the ground that plaintiff by acceptance of awards under the New York
Workmen's Compensation Law had "waived" his remedies under the federal statutes.
Plaintiff appealed on the ground that partial payments under an award were not a
bar to a subsequent action to recover damages; only a final award by the state board
would constitute an accord and satisfaction. Held, one judge dissenting, judgment
affirmed on the ground that the parties had entered into a "compromise" of plaintiff's
cause of action. Heagney v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 190 F. 2d 976
(2d Cir. 1951).
Authority abounds both in England' and in the United States2 for the proposition
that an accord while executory (i.e., unperformed) is not a bar to an action on
the original claim; that there must be an accord and a satisfaction 3 to extinguish
the prior obligation. In the past the courts have dealt with situations similar to the
instant case in terms of accord and satisfaction. The case of Brassel v. The Electric
Welding Co.4 involved an injured employee's suit against his employer after payment
and acceptance under a final award of the Compensation Board. The court held
that the employee's acceptance of full payment under a final award resulted in an
accord and satisfaction and destroyed his original cause of action. But in the case of
Larscy v. T. Hogan & Sons Inc.5 the employer and employee agreed in writing that
the injured employee's compensation was to be in accordance with the State Work-
men's Compensation Law. The employer made partial payments under the agreement
but, before an award had been made by the Board, the employee refused the balance
and brought suit on the original claim. The court held that "The agreement may
have amounted to an accord but payment only would amount to a satisfaction.
Until there were an accord and satisfaction of plaintiff's claim by full and complete
payment, the plaintiff was not barred from maintaining his action for negligence."0
Following the Larscy case, the court, in Fitzgerald v. Harbor Lighterage Co.,7 held
that an employee's acceptance of an award not final of the Compensation Board was
1. Peytoe's Case, 2 Brown & Gold. 75, 123 Eng. Rep. 823 (1613) ; Ford v. Beech, 11
Q.B. 852, 116 Eng. Rep. 693 (1847); ANsoN, CONTRACTS 496 (Corbin's ed. 1919).
2. Brown v. Spofford, 95 U. S. 474 (1877) ; Wyatt v. New York 0. & W. R. R., 45 F.
2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930); Larscy v. T. Hogan & Sons, Inc., 239 N. Y. 298, 146 N. E. 430
(1925) ; Frankfurt-Burnett Co. v. William Prym Co., 237 Fed. 21 (2d Cir. 1916); The
Joy, 290 Fed. 407 (E.D.N.Y. 1923).
3. "Accord is a satisfaction agreed upon between the party injuring and the party
injured; which, when performed, is a bar of all actions upon this account." 3 BL. ColA=. *16.
4. 239 N. Y. 78, 145 N. E. 745 (1924).
5. 239 N. Y. 298, 146 N. E. 430 (1925).
6. Id. at 301, 146 N. E. at 431.
7. 244 N. Y. 132, 155 N. E. 74 (1926).
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at most an accord and not a satisfaction; and that the employee could maintain
his action against his employer. In Wyatt v. New York, 0. & TV. R. R.8 the injured
employee entered into a written agreement with his employer to accept workmen's
compensation under the state law, but before an award of the Compensation Board
had been made he repudiated the agreement and sued under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act.9 The court held, citing the three Court of Appeals decisions discussed
above, that no performance short of a final award of the Board would be enough
to discharge the employee's original cause of action.
The foregoing cases have, without exception, applied the common law rule of
the executory accord: an accord if not followed by satisfaction, is no defense
to an action on the original claim. This rule had long been looked upon vith
disfavor and in 1937 the New York Legislature qualified it by providing that when
the accord is in writing the creditor's right to sue on the original cause of action
will be suspended so long as the debtor continues to perform the accord according
to its terms.' 0 In the instant case the employee's agreement to accept compensation
in exchange for his right to sue could only be implied from the facts and circum-
stances for no accord had ever been reduced to writing. Thus, if the court dealt ith
the problem in terms of accord and satisfaction, as had the cases above, it would
have been obliged presumably to apply the common law rule and, a final award
not having been made, the executory accord would not constitute a defense to the
employee's suit. Instead the majority of the court, in apparent circumvention of
the common law rule,11 construed the employee's acceptance of partial awards as
a full "compromise." This choice of terminology is not insignificant for by the
weight of authority a "compromise," even though executory, constitutes a bar
and merger of all pre-existing claims,' 2 while an oral executory accord, as observed,
is no defense.
Encyclopedists classify accord and satisfaction and compromise and settlement
as distinct legal categories each looking toward the discharge of rights of action.' 3
The courts, however, do not often refer to any basis for this distinction and in fact
often use the terms interchangeably.14 The courts' seemingly arbitrary use may
S. 45 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930).
9. 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. § 51 (1943).
10. N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAW § 33-a (2): "An executory accord, hereafter made, shall
not be denied effect as a defense or as the basis of an action or counterclaim by reason of
the fact that the satisfaction or discharges of the claim . . . which is the subject of the
accord was to occur at a time after the making of the accord, provided the promise of
the party against whom it is sought to enforce the accord is in writing and signed by
such party or by his agent."
11. The court indicated that it held the common law rule of the executory accord in
slight regard: "there is no mystic significance to be accorded a 'satisaction' upon some
assumed 'final' award." Heagney v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 190 F. 2d 976, 979
(2d Cir. 1951).
12. See e.g., Bandaman v. Finn, 185 N. Y. 503, 78 N. E. 175 (1506); Ferguson Lumber
Co. v. Elliot et al., 171 S. C. 455, 172 S. E. 616 (1934); Flegal v. Hoover et al., 156 Pa.
276; 27 Ati. 162 (1893).
13. See I C.J.S. 460 (1936); 15 C.J.S. 710 (1939).
14. In Shubert v. Rosenberger, 204 Fed. 934, 938 (8th Cir. 1913), the court said:
"there has generally been an interchangeable use of the terms 'accord and satisfaction' and
ccompromise and settlement' as to controversies over liquidated and unliquidated claims...."
And in City of San Juan v. St. John's Gas Co., 195 U.S. 510 (1904), both terms were
used in referring to the same transaction.
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be understood if it is recognized that the prior obligation is discharged when the
subsequent agreement is executed no matter how labelled. It is only when the
subsequent agreement is executory, as in the instant case, that the distinction between
these terms is of any legal consequence. It would seem, therefore, that this distinction
must rest on some fundamental basis. It has been said that only liquidated claims
may be the subject of a compromise while only unliquidated claims may be the
subject of an accord.J 6 This basis for the distinction would seem to be invalid for
the courts have used the terms without regard to the certainty of the claim.' 0 It is
submitted, however, that there exists a fundamentally sound basis for the distinction
between accord and satisfaction and compromise and settlement not clearly recognized
or announced by the courts. The nature of the claim is immaterial; what should
control is the intention of the parties. Thus without regard to the nature of the
claim, if the parties intend immediately to discharge the prior obligation, that
agreement is held to be a compromise"' and the original claim is extinguished;
but if such an intention is lacking the agreement is held to be an executory accord
and does not discharge the prior obligation.
Because the parties do not intend to discharge the prior claim by the executory
accord, does it necessarily follow that the creditor should be allowed to sue on
the original claim at will? Should not some effect be given the executory agree.
ment? May it not be reasonably inferred that the parties intended that the creditor
withhold suit on the original claim so long as the debtor faithfully continues to
perform in accordance with the accord?
The common law rule, as observed, gives no effect to the executory accord. The
Law Revision Commission in its recommendation to the Legislature, which resulted
in Section'33-a of the Personal Property Law, recognized that the failure to give
binding force to the executory accord is unsound in principle and unjust
in result; but cautioned that clear and definite proof of the existence of the accord
ought to be required.' 8 The commission suggested as a safeguard that the promise
of the party against whom the accord is sought to be enforced ought to be in writing.1"
The majority of the court in the instant case disapproved the common law rule2"
but could not apply the statute for the agreement had not been reduced to writing;
and stare decisis prevented it from directly overruling the cases above. Thus the
court in order to reach a just result was constrained to torture the agreement
into a "compromise." 21 It is undesirable that our courts should be forced to
15. Bandaman v. Finn, 185 N.Y. 508, 78 N. E. 175 (1906) ; Flegal v. Hoover et at., 156
Pa. 276, 27 AUt. 162 (1893).
16. See note 14 supra. The following cases involved unliquidated claims: i.x., negligence
claims. Nonetheless they were dealt with in terms of accord and satisfaction. Wyatt v.
New York, 0. & W. R. R., 45 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930); Fitzgerald v. Harbor Lighterage
Co., 244 N. Y. 132, 155 N. E. 74 (1926); Larscy v. T. Hogan & Sons, 239 N. Y. 298,
146 N. E. 430 (1925) ;,Brassel v. Electric Welding Co., 239 N. Y. 78, 145 N. E. 745 (1924).
17. In Wyatt v. New York 0. & W. R.R., supra. note 16, it was said that there Is a
presumption that the creditor does not intend to accept the agreement itself In discharge
of the prior claim but rather intends full performance as a pre-requisite to a discharge.
18. ANNuAL REPORT Or T= NEw Yoitx STATE LAv REvisIoN Coimu.nssioN 207 (1937).
19. See note 10 supra.
20. See note 11 supra.
21. The court in the instant case chose to rest its ultimate conclusion of compromise
upon the authority of 6 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 1268 (1951). Professor Corbin suggests
that the distinction between accord and satisfaction and compromise and settlement is
[Vol, 20
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employ such a device. Not only is the law thereby thrown into confusion;en but how
may an attorney counsel his client whose rights may by made to depend upon "labels."
It is submitted that if the courts are reluctant to overrule the common law rule
of the executory accord in toto the remedy for the harm of the instant case is in the
power of the New York Legislature which should amend section 33-a of the New
York Personal Property Law by removing the requirement of a writing, thereby
extending to the oral executory accord the rule suspending an action on the prior
obligation so long as the debtor continues to perform pursuant to the accord. The
problem of clear and definite proof of the accord might well be left to the courts.
AnY AxND NAVY-MILiTARY ORDER-ABUSE OF AUTHORITY IN DECIAR.M G A
BUsINEss "Op Lmrrs."--Defendant is a commanding general on an army post.
A lieutenant under his command purchased a car from plaintiffs who are used car
dealers in a neighboring city. The lieutenant claimed he had been defrauded and the
auto dealer refused to refund a sum of money in settlement of the controversy.
As a result, the defendant promulgated an executive order declaring plaintiffs'
place of business "off limits" to military personnel Defendant maintained that
he acted in accordance with army regulations in providing for the welfare of his
personnel.1 Plaintiff sought an injunction against the enforcement of the order
and an order requiring defendant to rescind it. Held, relief granted on the ground that
the defendant was not acting within the scope of his authority. Jones et al. v. Harper,
98 F. Supp. 460 (W. D. Okla. 1951).
The principle that a civil court has jurisdiction to act against a government
officer who acts completely without power is well settled.2 In Bates V. Clarks a
military officer was ordered to seize liquor in Indian country. When the fact was
established that the land on which the liquor was seized was not Indian country,
the act was on its face without authority and the officer was held liable in trespass.
However, if the officer acts within the scope of his power the court has no
invalid and that either an executory accord or an executory compromise should not discharge
but should suspend action on the prior claim so long as the debtor performs in accordance
with the subsequent agreement. The textwriter then suggests that those decisions should
be overruled which have allowed an action on the prior claim while the debtor was
willing and able to perform according to the terms of the executory accord.
22. In its attempt to evade the common law rule of the executory accord the court
gave greater effect to the agreement by construing it as a compromise than had it been
in writing and the statute applicable. Under the New York statute if the debtor breaches
the agreement the creditor may sue upon his original cause of action; but a compromise,
even though executory immediately discharges the prior claim and the creditor's only
recourse is upon the compromise agreement itself.
1. Ammy REG. No. 600-10 II 29: "To assist responsible commanders in maintaining
discipline and safeguarding the health and welfare of military personnel, establishments and
areas may be declared 'off limits' for troops, in which case military personnel are
proibited from entering them."
2. Morrison et al. v. Work et a!., 266 U.S. 4S1 (1925); Whalen v. Sheridan, 29 Fed.
Cas. 850 No. 17, 476 (C. C. S. D. N.Y. 1879); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877);
Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712 (1875).
3. 95 U.S. 204 (1877).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction to question the abuse of his discretion. 4 It is sufficient that the officer
acts in relation to matters committed by law to his control or supervision, or that
his acts have more or less connection with the general matter committed by law to
his control or supervision.0 Nor will civil liability attach because of a mistake of
fact or an erroneous construction and application of the law where an officer exercises
his discretion.7 Even the absence of probable cause and the presence of malice or
other bad motives are not sufficient to impose liability upon such an officer.8 The
reason given for the rule is one of public policy. Otherwise the perfect freedom which
ought to exist in the discharge of public duty might be seriously restrained.9
The decision in Ainsworth v. Barn Ballroom Co.'0 determined the validity of an
"off limits" order. There the commanding officer, pursuant to military regulations,
declared a dance hall "off limits." The District Court found that the defendant
officer had introduced no evidence to sustain the necessity of the "off limits" order
and issued an injunction restraining the officer from enforcing the order. But
the Court of Appeals, upon reviewing the case, held that this would not be a
justiciable controversy and concluded that the suit should be dismissed if the officer
acted under the discretionary authority duly delegated to him even though he may
have abused his discretion.
If the instant case stands for no more than a denial of the right of a commanding
officer to use his power of declaring an establishment "off limits" as a bludgeon to
compel a civilian to acquiese in the demands of a member of the command," there
can, of course, be no quarrel with the decision. There is, however, in the opinion,
language which suggests that fraudulent conduct on the part of a civilian businessman
can not constitute a proper cause for promulgating an "off limits" order; 12 that
the question of fraud being determinable only by the judicial branch of the govern-
ment, 13 the situation is not one appropriate for an executive order. If that be the
4. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942); United States ex rel. Creary v.
Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922); Dakota Central Telephone Co. et al. v. South Dakota el al.,
250 U.S. 163 (1919); Ainsworth v. Barn Ballroom Co., 157 F. 2d 97 (4th Cir. 1946)
Brown v. Sanford, 79 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 170 F. 2d 344 (5th Cir. 1948);
Keppleman v. Upston et al., 84 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Cox v. Gee, 60 N. C.
516, 2 Winst. 131 (1864); Thomas v. Raymond, 4 S.C. (4 Rich.) 347 (1864).
5. Cooper v. O'Connor et al., 99 F. 2d 136 (D. C. Cir. 1938) ; Standard Nut Margarine
Co. v. Mellon et al, 72 F. 2d 557 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 605 (1934).
6. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Cooper v. O'Connor et al., 99 F. 2d 135
(D.C. Cir. 1938).
7. Cooper v. O'Connor et al., 99 F. 2d 135 (D. C. Cir. 1938); Keppleman v. Upston
et al., 84 F. Supp. 478 (N. D. Cal. 1949).
8. Keppleman v. Upston et. al., supra note 7.
9. Cooper v. O'Connor et al., 99 F. 2d 135 (D. C. Cir. 1938) ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth,
24 App. D. C. 167 (1904).
10. 157 F. 2d 97 (4th Cir. 1946).
11. The court stated: "Solely because the plaintiffs would not refund to the lieutenant,
who claimed he had been defrauded, the sum of $1,006.00 in settlement of the controversy,
the defendant promulgated an executive order declaring plaintiffs' place of business
'off limits' to military personnel." Jones et al., v. Harper, 98 F. Supp. 460, 461 (W. D.
Okla. 1951).
12. "Here there was an attempt to substitute executive command for the orderly
judicial procedure which was available for settlement of this controversy." Ibid.
13. "The question of whether the soldier was defrauded is one that can be determined
only by the judicial branch of our government." Ibid.
[Vol. 20
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intent of the opinion its soundness may be seriously questioned. Fraud and sharp
practices employed against troops by businessmen in the vicinity of military establish-
ments affect the morale and therefore the welfare of troops and it is the duty of
commanding officers to protect members of the military establishment from all
sources threatening the welfare of their personnel. Even to compel the commander
to await the outcome of judicial proceedings in such a case is unrealistic. Assuming
the defendant guilty, there will be a considerable time lag before judgment; during
which time the commanding officer would not be able to invoke the power of "off
limits"; there may be a compromise; there may be no suit brought. Secondly, such
a requirement makes two naive assumptions: that truth cannot be determined
except by judicial proceeding, and that the outcome of a judicial proceeding is
invariably the truth. Even more important, however, is the fact that in invoking
this "off limits" authority the commanding officer must, as a result of his own
inquiry, make his own decision as to the truth or falsity of any allegation against a
civilian establishment and act in accordance therewith.
Experience and reason dictate the necessity for a more expeditious procedure
in the military than is thought tolerable in civil affairs. The relationship between a
commanding officer and his troops is unique. The status partakes of a quasi-family
relationship and the utmost freedom must be given the commanding officer in
supervising the welfare of his men and in performing duties incident to his office.
To achieve success he must not be hampered by outside intervention. If a strong
liberal position is not taken extending discretion to include any matter relating to
his mission, an insurmountable quantity of litigation would ensue, putting the
commander to unnecessary trouble and delay in its accomplishment. Such an exten-
sion of discretion is necessary to insure the promptness and certainty which is basic
in military commands. The remedy against abuse of authority should be sought
by the civilian in military channels by appeal to the superiors of the acting officer
rather than in civil courts.
ASSIGNMENTS-FEDERAL ANTI-AsSIGNMENT STATUTE-VOLUNTARY AsSIGNEE OF A
CTAIn CAN AINTAIN ACTION AGAINST UNITED STATES WHEN ALL PARTI ARn
BEFORE THE CouRT.7-Vendors leased land to the United States and, subject to the
lease, later conveyed it to the plaintiffs, assigning to them any cause of action which
the vendors might have against the United States for damages to the land. After
the conveyance, the United States, the vendors and the plaintiffs entered into a
tripartite agreement setting forth the conveyance and stating that the vendors released
the United States from all claims and reserved them to the plaintiffs. An action
impleading the vendors was instituted for damages, which the Government conceded,
but the plaintiffs' right to recover was contested because of the provisions of the
Federal anti-assignment statute. The District Court rendered judgment for the
plaintiffs. Upon appeal, held, one judge dissenting, judgment affirmed. United States
v. Shannon et al, 186 F. 2d 430 (4th Cir. 1951).
The broad provisions of the Federal anti-assignment statute' appear to invalidate
1. 35 STAT. 41 (1903), 31 U.S.C. 203 (1927). "All transfers and asignments made of
any claim upon the United States, or of any part or share thereof, or interest therein,
whether absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the consideration therefore, and all
powers of attorney, orders or other authorities for receiving payment of any such claim,
or of any part or share, thereof . . . shall be absolutely null and void, unless they are
freely made and executed in the presence of at least two attesting witneses after the
1951]
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the assignment of all claims against the United States made prior to their allowance,
and in the earlier decisions the language of the statute was thus strictly applied. A
voluntary assignee of a claim was not permitted to maintain an action against the
Government.2 In Spofford v. Kirk,3 where the action was brought against the assignor
to impress a lien on his recovery, the court dismissed the action on the ground that
the assignment was absolutely null and void. There is reason, therefore, why the
decision in the instant case permitting the voluntary assignee of a claim against the
Government to sue in his own name was considered by the dissenting judge to be
directly in conflict with the statute.
However, in Goodman v. Niblack,4 the Supreme Court refused to invalidate the
voluntary assignment of a claim transferred as part of a general assignment for the
benefit of creditors. The Court followed the reasoning used in the decisions holding
that assignments by operation of law are not within the statutory ban. Those
decisionsO hold that the purpose of the statute is to prevent such evils as the
multiple payment of a claim against the Government, or the necessity of the Govern-
ment determining the validity of an alleged assignment. And since assignments by
operation of law will not result in such evils they are not prohibited by the statute.
In St. Paul & Duluth Railroad Co. v. United States,0 the Supreme Court reverted
to a strict interpretation of the statute stating that if an assignee by operation of
law had first obtained an interest in the claim by means of a voluntary transfer, the
statute would apply and invalidate the assignment. In that case it was held that the
voluntary transfer by mortgage did not clearly indicate a transfer of the claim
against the Government. Hence the reference by the Court to the anti-assignment
statute was unnecessary to the decision. But in the same volume of the Supreme
Court Reports, when the question was properly before it, 7 the Court, citing the
St. Paul & Dduth case, held that the statute invalidated the assignment by operation
of law since that assignment was preceded by a voluntary transfer, i.e., a mortgage.
These decisions are questionable. If at the foreclosure sale a third party instead of
the mortgagee had purchased the claim, the court could not with reason have invali-
dated the assignment, which had resulted by operation of law, merely because it
had originated in a voluntary transfer.8 The merely accidental fact that the mortgagee
was the sole, or lowest bidder should not change the result. In either event the
assignment was not the result of a voluntary transfer by mortgage but was effected
by the judicial sale. This inconsistency may have been impliedly resolved by the
decision in United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.9 There the court held that
insurers who were subrogated to the rights of their insured were assignees by operation
allowance of such claim, the ascertainment of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant
for payment thereof."
2. United States v. Gillis, 95 U.S. 407 (1877).
3. 97 U.S. 484 (1878).
4. 102 U.S. 556 (1881).
5. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 336 (1949); Western
Pacific R.R. v. United States, 268 U.S. 271 (1925); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United
States, 256 U.S. 655 (1921); Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S. 410 (1899); Erwin v. United
States, 97 U.S. 392 (1878).
6. 112 U.S. 733 (1885).
7. Flint and PNre Marquette R.R. v. United States, 112 U.S. 762 (1885).
8. In Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 256 U.S. 655 (1921), the Court held
valid the consolidation and merger of two corporations pursuant to a state statute.
9. 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
[Vol, 20
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of law. In reaching this conclusion the court did not consider the fact that, prior to
the subrogation, the insurance contract was voluntarily entered into by the insured.
Departing from the strict interpretation of the statute the Court, in Martin v.
National Surety Co. et al.,' 0 which involved a controversy between the assignor
whom the Government had paid, and the assignee, applied to a voluntary assignment
the reasoning of decisions involving assignments by operation of law. Holding that
"the statute must be interpreted in the light of its purpose to give protection to the
Government"" the Court allowed the assignee to recover on the assignment.
In the instant case the majority of the court held that, while the voluntary assign-
ment fell within the language of the anti-assignment statute, the fact that the plain-
tiffs had impleaded the vendors prevented the occurrence of the evil sought to be
avoided by the statute, i.e., the multiple liability of the Government on a single
claim. Then broadly applying the decision in the Martin case the Court of Appeals
held that the vendors, unless precluded by their release, could recover against the
Government and that a trust would be impressed upon the recovery in favor of the
plaintiffs. It is to be noted that in the Martin case the action was brought by the
assignee against the assignor after the Government had paid the latter and was no
longer an interested party while in the instant case the assignee brought an action
directly against the Government on a claim still outstanding. However, since the
impleading of the vendors brought all possible parties before it,12 the court appeared
to consider that this circumstance brought the instant case within the rule of the
Martin case.
As a result of this decision it would seem that the paramount consideration in the
application of the anti-assignment statute should be whether the Government will be
protected against possible multiple claims of liability, and that such possible claims
are obviated when both assignor and assignee are before the court. Unfortunately
the decision of the court is not so categorical. The court emphasizes the assumed
mistaken understanding on the part of the parties of the law in respect to the effect
of the assignment. The court states that "relief is given to the assignees, not as a
matter of law, but as a matter of equity because of the mistake involved and the
hardship which would otherwise result"' 3
Actions against the United States, whether under the Tucker Act1 4 or the Federal
Tort Claims Act,'1 are actions at law, although in enforcing such claims the court
does possess some equitable jurisdiction.'10 However, since the United States cannot
be sued except by its consent, it can, in the form of the anti-assignment statute or
otherwise, set any limitations desired to the recovery of any claims against it. Equi-
table considerations would appear to be beside the point, except so far as Congress
10. 300 U.s. 588 (1937).
11. Id. at 596.
12. The Court of Appeals quotes with approval the finding of the District Court that
"'In this case, however, all of the possible claimants against the United States in this
cause of action now stand before the judicial forum."' United States v. Shannon et al.,
186 F. 2d 430, 432 (4th Cir. 1951).
13. Id. at 434.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1948).
15. 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b) (1948).
16. Bonner v. United States, 9 Wall. 156 (U.S. 1869), held that the United States
could not be sued in the Court of Claims solely upon equitable considerations. In United
States v. Milliken Imprinting Co, 202 U.S. 168 (1906), the Court held that by virtue of
congressional legislation the Court of Claims had power to reform a contract.
19511
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has deemed fit to include them in the legislation permitting or regulating recovery
on claims against the United States. The purpose behind the enactment of the anti-
assignment statute is entirely a matter of congressional intent.
It would have been better for the sake of clarity in the law had the majority of
the court squarely based its decision rightly or wrongly upon the court's interpretation
of what Congress intended in enacting the statute, rather than upon .references to
seemingly extraneous considerations of "equity" and "hardships."
CONFLICT OF LAws-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT OF CUSTODY DECREES-WHETHIER
BASED ON DOMICILE OR PERSONAL JURISDICTION.-The Plaintiff brought a habeas
corpus proceeding in Pennsylvania to enforce a final divorce decree of an Ohio Court
making permanent a previous temporary decree awarding her the custody of her
child. At the time of the first Ohio decree the child was living with the paternal
great-grandfather in Pennsylvania, having left Ohio on April 1, 1949, four days
before the hearing in this Ohio action. On April 8, 1949, a divorce decree was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff awarding her temporary custody and placing the
child in the care of the paternal great-grandfather in Pennsylvania. On Oct. 26,
1949, while the child was still residing in Pennsylvania, but both parents were
within the personal jurisdiction of the Ohio court the plaintiff was awarded permanent
custody. On appeal from the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision which reversed
the trial court, held, two judges dissenting, the decision of the trial court awarding
custody to the defendant affirmed on the ground that the Ohio decree was not entitled
to full faith and credit due to the Ohio court's lack of jurisdiction over the child.
Commonwealth ex rel Graham v. Graham et al., 367 Pa. 553, 80 A. 2d 829 (1951).
The majority of the court in the instant case questioned the jurisdiction of the
Ohio court in the first Ohio action because the child at the time of the decrees
was without the territorial limits of the court, and then based its decision upon
its own ruling that the child was domiciled1 in Pennsylvania at the time of the
second Ohio decree.2 When the first decree by the Ohio court was rendered both
parents were domiciled in Ohio. Although before the hearing the child had been
sent to his paternal great-grandparents' home in Pennsylvania, the presence of the
infant within the territorial limits of the court was unnecessary for.the court to
decide the issue of custody. The domicile of an infant is determined by the domicile
of his father. 3 Therefore, since the father was domiciled in Ohio the Ohio court
in its divorce decree could validly award the mother of the infant temporary custody.
1. The court stresses the fact that the first Ohio order while awarding temporary
custody to the mother provided that the child be "domiciled" with the great-grandfather In
Pennsylvania. Obviously the intention of the Ohio court was to provide that the child
would reside with the great-grandfather and the word "domicile" was not used In Its
restricted sense. If it were, custody would necessarily have been awarded to the great-
grandfather by the Ohio court.
2. The court might have based its decision solely upon the ground that the conditions
affecting the child had materially changed, since the court indicated this development In
its opinion. It is generally conceded that orders fixing custody are temporary in nature
and subject to modification to meet changing conditions and if a court finds that conditions
have changed it may award custody of the child according to its best interest on the basis
of facts subsequently arising. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 147 (1934).
3. GooDRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 83 (3d ed. 1949) ; RESTATEM.NT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 30 (1934).
[Vol. 20
RECENT DECISIONS
The majority of the court also contended that the Ohio court could no longer
control the custody of the child since, even assuming that the Ohio court did have
jurisdiction in the first Ohio action, it had lost jurisdiction upon the issuance of
the temporary decree.4 As suggested by the dissent, the majority failed to take
into consideration an important factor involved: The custody of the child was
awarded the mother in the temporary decree.
When a divorce or separation is granted to the wife and the custody of the infant
is also awarded to her, the rule that the father's domicile controls the infant's no
longer applies. The domicile of a minor child in such a case is then controlled by
the domicile of the mother.5 When custody was awarded to the mother in the first
Ohio action the child's domicile remained in Ohio for the mother never changed
her domicile from Ohio.6 Therefore when Ohio issued a decree awarding permanent
custody to the mother the question whether the child was in the state or whether
the husband had changed his domicile to Pennsylvania in no way affected the
domicile of the infant since his mother's domicile was controlling upon the question
of his domicile.7 Pennsylvania has already been committed to this rule by its
highest courts.8
It would seem that both the majority and the minority of the court in the principal
case have failed to give proper significance to the fact that both parents were
personally subject to the Ohio court's process. While it is true that the majority
of courts when dealing with the problem of infant's custody base their decision on
4. Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Graham ct al., 367 Pa. 553, 559, 80 A. 2d 829,
832 (1951): "If it be assumed that the Ohio court had jurisdiction of the subject matter
(status of the child) to enter the order of April 8, 1949, and that full faith and credit must
be extended thereto, it must be recognized that the order definitely establishes the domicile
and residence of the child in Pennsylvania. The Ohio court not only permitted, but
directed that the domicile as well as the residence of the child, the controlling factors as
to jurisdiction, be in Pennsylvania. While the child is domiciled and resident in Pennsylvania,
the Ohio court is without jurisdiction of the person and subject matter . . ."
5. Commonwealth ex rel. Camp v. Camp, 150 Pa. Super. 649, 29 A. 2d 363 (1942);
RESTATEmET, ConmTrC OF LAWS § 32 (1934).
6. The question whether a wife having obtained custody can change a child's domicile
by moving to another state is thoroughly discussed in Goodrich, Custody of Children in
Divorce Suits, 7 CoaNn.a. L.Q.'1 (1921). See also Griffin v. Griffin, 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac.
598 (1920).
7. The instant court wrote concerning this point: "When the father returned to
Pennsylvania on June 11, 1949, more than four months before the Ohio decree of October
26, 1949, and made his home with the great-grandfather and child in this State, whatever
may have been the status of the child, it is clear that residence ripened into domicile."
Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Graham et al., 367 Pa. 553, 560, 80 A. 2d 829, 833 (1951).
But cf. Pieretti v. Pieretti, 13 N. J. Misc. 98, 176 At. 589 (Ch. 1935); Ex parte McCoun,
96 Kan. 314, 150 Pac. 516 (1915); Beale, Domicil of an Infant, 8 CoRurJXL L.Q. 103, 104
(1923): "Even though the child is in fact living apart from the father, his legal domicil
is nevertheless with the father [in the case at bar the mother has custody] and he cannot
acquire a domicil by any will or act of his own, even though ... the child was allowed
by the father to live with the grandparents."
8. Commonwealth ex rel. Camp v. Camp, 150 Pa. Super. 649, 29 A. 2d 363 (1942).
Cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac. 598 (1920) ; Groves v. Barto et al., 109 Wash. 112,
186 Pac. 300 (1919). See also Beale, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920, 34 HaRv. L. Rxv.
50, 58 (1920).
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domicile,9 several decisions have supported the proposition that personal jurisdiction
over both the parents supplies effective jurisdiction over the child although the
infant is actually domiciled and residing in another state. 10
The Supreme Court of the United States seems inclined toward this view. In
Yarborough v. Yarborough" a child claimed a right to payments from her father for
education, despite a lump sum payment by the father pursuant to a divorce decree,
on the ground that she had not been served with process nor was she residing within
the state when the support provisions for her had been fixed and, therefore, was not
bound by the decree. The court said: "As that suit embraces within its scope
the disposition and care of minor children, jurisdiction over the parents confers
eo ipso jurisdiction over the minor's custody and support."'12 Although the question
of custody was not before the court in the Yarborough case, the above quoted
expression would seem to indicate an adherence to the principle that where jurisdiction
is obtained over both parents, a decree in which custody of a minor child Is
adjudicated is entitled to full faith and credit throughout the states even if the
infant is without the state or domiciled elsewhere.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FIRST AMENDMENT-VALIDITY OF RELEASED TIME PROGRAM.
-Petitioners, parents of pupils in a New York City public school, brought a
mandamus proceeding to compel the New York City Board of Education to discontinue
and abolish the released time program in the city schools. This program operates
under statutory provisions releasing students, with a written request issued by the
particular religious organization and countersigned by the parents, one hour a week to
attend religious instructions at classes given by said religious organizations outside
the school premises. No announcements are made at the public schools concerning
these classes and no comment is allowed upon any pupil's attendance or failure to
attend. Petitioners aver that this program and the statutes under which it operates are
violative of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I
Section 3 of the New York State Constitution. The Appellate Division, two justices
dissenting, affirmed an order of the Special Term directing a dismissal of the petition on
the merits. On appeal, one judge dissenting, held, affirmed on the grounds that the
program and its enabling statutes are constitutional and in no way violative of
petitioners' rights. Matter of Zorach et al. v. Clauson et al., 303 N. Y. 161, 100 N. E.
2d 463 (1951).
Leaving aside the question as to whether the petitioners' allegations required a trial
of issues of fact, the principal case presents a single question: does the decision of
9. 47 MIcir. L. REv. 703 (1949).
10. Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W. Va. 124, 81 S. E. 706 (1914); Stephens v. Stephens,
53 Idaho 427, 24 P. 2d 52 (1933). New York is among the states holding that jurisdiction
over the parents gives jurisdiction over the child. People ex rel. Ludden v. Winston, 34
Misc. 21, 69 N.Y. Supp. 452 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 61 App. Div. 614,70 N.Y.
Supp. 1146 (1st Dep't 1901). In May v. May, 233 App. Div. 519, 253 N.Y. Supp 606
(1st Dep't 1931), the court said: "It is true that where both parties are before the
court, custody of a child or children without the jurisdiction may be made. That, however
may be done merely because the parties are personally before the court, which, by virtue
of its control-over such persons, may enforce its commands with respect to each." Id at
520, 253 N.Y. Supp. at 608.
11. 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
12. Id. at 210.
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the Supreme Court of the United States in Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of
Education' render unconstitutional the New York released time program? If it does
not, the previously announced decison of the Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Lewis
v. Graves,2 upholding a similar program as constitutional, controls.
Little can be added to the opinion of the court, written by Judge Froessel, which
distinguishes the McColum case on the facts and emphasizes the admittedly consti-
tutional right of parents to direct the education of their children.3 Judge Desmond's
well reasoned concurring opinion in part, and it is submitted, correctly, questions
the fundamental soundness of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amend-
ment in the Everson4 and McCollun. cases.
Judge Fuld, in his lone dissent, states his position: "what is here involved, is not
the right of a parent, but rather a basic limitation on the power of the state."3'
The First Amendment forbids laws "respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." G An established church is to some extent detri-
mental to freedom of worship. The two phrases of the First Amendment are, there-
fore, somewhat complimentary. However the Supreme Court in the Everson and
McCollum cases has determined that the framers of the First Amendment intended,
not only to grant religious freedom to everyone, but also to require State and Federal
legislation to be absolutely irreligious, 7 forbidding the legislature to "aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."s This was accomplished by
supplanting the plain and unambiguous language of the First Amendment, consistent
with its historical meaning,9 with the much maligned metaphorical expressign: the
high and impregnable wall of separation between church and state.10
Accepting, as we must, the basically erroneous interpretation of the First Amend-
ment as representing the law as it exists today, Judge Fuld's statement of the problem
1. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
2. 245 N.Y. 195, 156 N.E. 663 (1927). This case has been followed by the highest
courts of California and Illinois in Gordon v. Board of Education, 78 Cal. App. 2d 464,
178 P.2d 488 (1947), .and People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Education, 394 IMI. 228, 63
N. E. 2d 305 (1946). In both cases programs substantially the same with the plan at hand
were held not to be violative, of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
or the respective state Constitutions.
3. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
4. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The transportation of Catholic
school children using public funds was held to promote the general welfare of the student
and to be a valid exercise of the police power, aiding religions only incidentally.
5. Matter of Zorach et at. v. Clauson et al., 303 N. Y. 161, 191, 100 N. E. 2d 463, 479
(1951).
6. U.S. CoNsT. AmEND. I.
7. See Schmidt, Religious Liberty and the Supreme Court of the United States, 17 Fort.
L. REv. 173 (1948).
S. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), quoted with approval in
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203,'210 (1943).
9. See O'N=mr, PE LIGION AN EDUCATION U.NDER T Co.sTITun0:; (1st ed. 1949), for
an informative and competent analysis of the basic constitutional and historical errors in the
McCollum and Everson cases.
10. The danger in this type of judicial expression has been revealed by Judge Cardozo
in Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926), wherein he wrote
"Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
they end often by enslaving it!' Id. at 94, 155 N. E. at 61.
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is not entirely inaccurate. Prescinding from the unquestioned right of parents to
control the education of their children, the problem remains as to what limitation
is placed upon the states' right to co-operate with such parents and the religious
organizations to which they adhere, in providing for the religious education of such
children who may attend public schools.
Judge Fuld argues that, while the facts in the McCollum case, namely, religious
instruction on public school premises under the active supervision of the school
authorities, differ from those in the instant case, the Supreme Court's "conclusion
and principles which it enunciated are broad in scope and clearly reach far beyond
the precise fact situation there presented."" Of course, such a view, on its face ignores
the basic rule that a decision is binding precedent only in respect to the facts before
the court rendering the decision.' 2 This should be particularly true where justices
deem it necessary to express their own views in separate opinions as in the Mcgollum
case. Language taken from a number of opinions can not safely be used to qualify
or enlarge the holding of the court on the particular facts before it.'3 As a matter
of fact there are throughout the majority and two concurring opinions of the McCol.
lurn case expressions indicating that the court was considering only the precise fact
situation then before it.' 4
Succinctly stated, Judge Fuld's position is that the released time program in the
McCollum case was struck down not simply because the program showed a use of
the public school premises but because the program exerted certain inherent pressures
on the pupil to attend classes in religious instructions and thus afforded "invaluable
aid" to sectarian groups. Principal reliance for this position is based upon certain
language of Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, in the McCollum case. 5 How-
ever, as the majority opinion in the principal case indicates, the only language of
Mr. Justice Black which even approaches a precise statement of the holding in the
McCollum case is his statement that "the foregoing facts [The Champaign Program]
show the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close co-
operation between the school authorities and the religious council in promoting
religious education."' 6 Judge Fuld admits that "there may be room for argument
as to which phrase, separated from context, best reflects the sense to be distilled
from the several opinions written" but concluded that "there can be no doubt what-
11. Matter of Zorach et al. v. Clauson et al, 303 N.Y. 161, 185, 100 N. E. 2d 463, 475
(1951).
12. Judge Desmond ably states the point "Stare decisis does not mean stare verbis."
Id. at 176, 100 N.E. 2d at 470.
13. An obvious illustration of this is contained in Judge Fuld's dissenting opinion, (id.
at 186, 100 N. E. 2d at 476), where he relies on a statement in the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Reed in the McCollum case concluding that the majority intended to ban all
released time programs as "the common ground and ultimate conclusions of his brethren's
opinions." Judge Fuld ignores Mr. Justice Reed's companion statement that the majority
opinions "seem to leave open for further litigation variations from the Champaign plan."
333 U.S. 203, 239 (1948):
14. "We do not consider, as indeed we could not, school programs not before us...."
333 U. S. 203, 231 (1948). "The substantial differences among arrangements lumped to-
gether as 'released time' emphasizes the importance of detailed analysis of the facts to
which the Constitutional test of Separation is to be applied." Id. at 226.
15. Id. at 203, 209, 210, 212, quoted in Matter of Zorach et al. v. Clauson et al., 303
N.Y. 161, 186, 100 N.E.2d 463, 47d (1951).
16. 333 U.S. 203, 209 (1948).
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soever as to the net result." i 7 The question now to be considered is what was the
net result of the decision in the McColluitm case? It was that the religious instruction
program as administered in Champaign, Illitwis, was unconstitutional. No further
did or could the Court hold.
Even if we assume that the Champaign program helped to provide pupils for the
religious classes through the use of the state's compulsory education machinery, as
Mr. Justice Black contended, or presented powerful elements of inherent pressure
by the school system in the interest of religious sects, as ir. Justice Frankfurter
contended-both questionable conclusions of fact--the New York program can not
be thus characterized. Judge Fuld can cite only two concrete facts as instances of
so-called inherent pressure: (1) one hour of released time; and (2) a report to the
school authorities of attendance at the religious instruction classes.
The release of a pupil for one hour a week does not violate the state's compulsory
education laws,' 8 and as Judge Froessel correctly points out, if it is constitutional
to excuse children for holy days of their respective faiths, it should also be consti-
tutional to excuse them for a part of a day for another religious purpose. In answer-
ing this argument Judge Fuld appears to state a distinction without an essential
difference. He states that religious observance of holy days necessarily requires
attendance at church or temple at stated times which "may" coincide with school
hours. He also adopts Mr. Justice Frankfurter's suggestion that the constitutional
prohibitions may be avoided by giving the religious instruction under the "dismissed
time" program whereby all students are released unconditionally and those choosing
to attend religious instructions may do so on their own time. However in many
instances attendance at church on holy days is required for only part of a day, in
the case of certain Roman Catholic holy days, one hour or less at mass, vith most
masses said before school hours begin. If compliance with the compulsory education
laws constitutionally forbids released time for religious instructions during school
hours, it would seem that released time for attendance at church where such attend-
ance may take place outside the school hours, should also be unconstitutional o
On the matter of reports of attendance the New York program explicitly forbids
comment by any principal or teacher on the attendance or non-attendance of any
pupil. This report is available solely for the purpose of assuring the school authorities
that the child really has an excuse for being released from class. Certainly such
action by the school for that purpose does not of itself constitute an "invaluable aid"
to religion.
It is true that the pupil's knowledge that a record is kept of his attendance may
have the effect of exerting some pressure upon him to attend. However, such an
effect, if it exists, is merely incidental. No one could question the constitutional
right of school authorities to check upon attendance at church or temple, or the
pupils religious preference, where absence from school is sought for attendance at
17. See Matter of Zorach et al. v. Clauson et a!., 303 N.Y. 161, 185I, I0 N.E.2d 463,
476 (1951).
18. In People ex reL Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y. 195, 156 N.E. 663 (1927), the Court
of Appeals held that the Compulsory Education Law did not demand complete attendance
but regular attendance, else the word "regularly" appearing in the statute would be super-
fluous. On this point the case overrules Stein v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N.Y. Supp. 822
(Sup. Ct. 1925).
19. Naw YORM EDUCATiO LAW §3210(1)(b) provides: "Absence [of a pupil from
school] for religious observance and education shall be permitted under rules that the
commissioner shall establish."
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religious services, or otherwise to observe a holy day. Any pressure on the pupil to
attend the services or to declare a religious belief, which might result, could not
render the excused absence an unconstitutional aid to religion.
In apparent recognition of the inadequacy of concrete evidence to show pressure,
Judge Fuld is remitted to more intangible grounds. He finds as a fact that "the entire
vitality of the program lies in the prestige, planning, cooperation and assistance lent
by the public school system."'20 Judge Fuld can not point to any specific "planning"
and, as has been noted, the purely negative and passive co-operation and assistance
lent by the public school system consists simply in excusing the pupil. Nor does
Judge Fuld specify in what' respect the "prestige" of the public school system gives
the program its "entire vitality." Admittedly, were there no public school system
the program would be unnecessary and would not exist. In this sense alone does the
"entire vitality" of the program depend upon the public school system. Pupils whose
parents wish them to receive religious instruction happen to attend a public school
perhaps because of the inaccessibility or expense of a sectarian school. An analogous
situation appears where a military superior announces church services and releases
the servicemen from the regular duties to attend. Can it be contended that the prestige
of the military service is being used to foster religion? The conclusion of the dissent
that the "prestige" of the public school system or any other vague concept such as
"the momentum of the whole school atmosphere and planning" compels the child to
attend religious instruction classes is just not the fact.
Following Mr. Justice Frankfurter's lead Judge Fuld also points to the intangible
factors of "divisiveness" and "the feeling of separatism" allegedly engendered by
the released time program. As grounds for criticizing the merits of the program such
factors, if they exist, are, as Judge Desmond ably points out, constitutionally mean-
ingless. "What petitioners are saying is that they dislike the whole enterprise, and
consider it socially undesirable. Those are predilections and not questions of law."21
However Judge Fuld also appeals to these factors as instances of "inherent pressure,"
The complete answer to such an approach is that any such divisiveness or feeling of
separation which may exist among public school children results, not from the released
time program, but from the fact that the First Amendment not only prohibits "an
establishment of religion" but also legislative restrictions upon the free exercise of
one's religion. Non-conformity resulting in divisiveness is a constitutional right 22
which even public school children may enjoy. As Judge Froessel points out, excusing
children from school on their holy days produces "a most obvious form of divisiveness
not paralleled in the released time program. '23
The attack on the released time program is a logical and not unexpected result of
the extreme dicta, expressed without historical or constitutional justification, by the
members of the Supreme Court in the Everson and McCollum cases. A review of
the principal case by the Supreme Court2 4 will afford that court an opportunity at
least to limit the McCollum decision to its precise factual situation. If the logical,
historically and constitutionally sound view so ably presented in Judge Desmond's
concurring opinion prevails, the Supreme Court of the United States would be
justfied in reversing the McCollum decision.
20. Matter of Zorach et al. v. Clauson el al., 303 N.Y. 161, 188, 100 N.E. 2d 463, 477
(1951).
21. Id. at 177, 100 N.E.2d at 471.
22. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
23. Matter of Zorach et al. v. Clauson et al., 303 N.Y. 161, 173, 100 N. E. 2d 463, 468
(1951).
24. On December 11, 1951, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
to petitioners in the principal case. - U.S. - (1951).
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DAaIAGES-ADMIRALTY--CONVERSION OF EXCHANGE RATE N TORT C Eszs.-
Libellant's vessel, a British steamship, and an American tankship owned by claimant
collided in the harbor of Belfast, Ireland, in British territorial waters. After litigation,
the dispute between the parties was compromised whereby the claimant agreed to pay
75 per cent of the damages of the libellant. One of the items of the compromise Vas
a bill for repairs incurred in the United States. This bill was paid to the repairer by
the United States War Shipping Administration and debited by them against the
credit of the British Government. Libellant was debited by the British Government
on a pre-existing account owed to it a certain amount of pounds sterling equivalent
to the repair bill at the then prevailing exchange rate of $4.025. Subsequent to the
compromise the British Government devalued its currency to the exchange rate of
$2.80. Libellant contended that the amount due for the repair item should be con-
verted at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of the tort. The district court
held applicable the exchange rate at the time of the entry of the decree. On appeal,
held, one Judge dissenting, judgment affirmed. Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. Steam-
ship Fredericksburg, et aL, 189 F. 2d 952 (2d Cir. 1951).
Since the law in this country requires that damages awarded in a civil action must
be in the money of the forum,' fluctuations of exchange rates compel the courts to
ascertain the correct date at which to convert the damages measured in foreign cur-
rency into American currency. In the federal courts two rules have been laid down
for ascertaining the conversion rate of foreign exchange in contract actions.2 If the
contract is to be performed here or the debt is due in this country in terms of
foreign currency, the conversion date is the date when the breach occurred or the
debt became due.3 On the other hand, if the contract is to be performed or the
debt was payable in a foreign country, the conversion date is the date of the entry
of the judgment.4 The former rule is generally referred to as the breach day rule
and the latter as the judgment day rule.
The New York rule as laid down in the contract case of Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic
Bank5 does not appear to apply the above distinction but rather to hold that, regard-
less of where the contract was to be performed or where the debt became payable,
the New York courts will apply the exchange rate at the time of the breach.0 A
strong dictum in the Hoppe case indicates that the same rule is applicable to a tort
action.7 The New York rule appears to conflict with the judgment day rule where
1. Frontera Transportation Co. v. Albaunza, 271 Fed. 199 (5th Cir. 1921).
2. The majority of the decided cases on the question of the applicable exchange rate
have been in this field.
3. Hicks et al. v. Guiness et al., 269 U.S. 71 (1925). See Det Forenede Dampshibs
Seiskab v. Insurance Co. of North America, 31 F. 2d 658 (2d Cir. 1929).
4. Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. $17 (1926). Apparently
by inadvertence the Deutsche decision adopted the date when suit is brought as the date
of conversion into dollars, whereas later decisions following the Deutsche case consistently
apply the date of entry of judgment. The Intergritas, 3 F. Supp. 891 (D. Md. 1933). In
Zimmerman, et al. v. Sutherland, et al., 274 U.S. 253 (1927), Holmes, J., analyzed the
distinction in the federal rule and stated: "The distinction between the Deutsche Barb
case and Hicks v. Guiness, 269 U.S. 71, is not, as argued, that the plaintiff in Hicks v.
Guiness was in the United States, but that, as the Court understood the facts, the debt was
payable in New York and subject to American Law, so that upon a breach of the contract
there arose a present liability in dollars." Id. at 255.
5. 235 N.Y. 37, 138 N.E. 497 (1923).
6. Ibid.
7. "In an action properly brought in the courts of this state by a citizen or an alien to
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the latter is employed by the federal courts, even though a dictum in a recent Appel-
late Division opinion attempts to bring the New York and federal rules into accord.8
However, the authorities cited in that Appellate Division decision, arp of questionable
value9 and, although the dictum indicates the court's desire to reconcile the divergent
rules, it would seem that the breach day rule generally represents the New York law.
Litigation in the tort field, involving this problem of converting foreign currency
into dollars, has been much less frequent than in the field of contract law. This is
due undoubtedly to the fact that most of the tort cases which arise have been for
unliquidated damages unrelated to foreign currencies and the American forum will in
such cases fix the damages in its own currency without any need for a conversion
from a foreign currency. However, in order to ascertain some general rules to be
applied to the tort cases, it may be helpful to consider the theory behind the two
recover damages, liquidated or .unliquidated, for breach of contract or for a tort, where
primarily the plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum expressed in foreign money, in determin-
ing the amount of the judgment expressed in our currency the rate of exchange prevailing
at the date of the breach of contract or at the date of the commission of the tort is under
ordinary circumstances to be applied." Ibid.
8. See Application of United Shellac Corp., 277 App. Div. 147, 97 N.Y. S. 2d 817 (1st
Dep't 1950), in which the court stated: "The question, in such cases, ordinarily resolves
itself into whether, in arriving at the amount to be awarded measured by the currency of
another country, the foreign exchange is to be translated into American currency as of
the date of the breach of contract or the day of the judgment. Where the suit in this
country is based upon an obligation existing -under foreign law, to be performed abroad,
and the jurisdiction of our courts arises merely from 'the fact that the creditor happens
to be able to catch his debtor here', (Deusche Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U.S, 517, 519),
the amount of the judgment (or award) is adjusted according to the exchange rate which
prevails on the day of judgment (Richard v. American Union Bank, 241 N.Y. 163;
Metcalf Co. v. Mayer, supra; Sirie v. Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529; Deutsche Bank v.
Humphrey, supra). On the other hand, if the contract is to be performed here, then the
exchange rate to be applied is that which obtained at the time of default, when the
contract was broken (Hicks v. Gainess, 269 U.S. 71; Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235
N.Y. 37, explained on the basis of this distinction in Richard v. American Union Batik,
supra; 5 Williston on Contracts [Rev. ed.), § 1410A)." Id. at 152, 97 N.Y.S. 2d at 822.
See also Side v. Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N.Y. Supp. 52 (1st Dep't 1921);
Metcalf Co. v. Mayer et a!., 213 App. Div. 607, 211 N.Y. Supp. 53 (1st Dep't 1925);
RESTATE rNT, CONFLiCT oF LAWS N.Y. ANNOT. §§423, 424 (1935).
9. See e.g., Richard et a. v. American Union Bank, 241 N.Y. 163, 149 N.E. 338 (1925),
which was used as authority for both judgment day and breach day rules. It is submitted
that the case is scant authority for the distinction made by the federal court in view of
the peculiar circumstances of that case and the subsequent decision handed down by the
Court of Appeals in a later appeal. There, plaintiff had amended his complaint to allege
that the foreign currency purchased was to be used in dealing in foreign exchange, where-
upon, the court indicated that plaintiff could recover the difference in the market price
here of the foreign currency between the time of promised and actual delivery. Richard
et al. v. American Union Bank, 253 N.Y. 166, 170 N.E. 532 (1930). See also Sire v.
Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N.Y. Supp. 52 (1st Dep't 1921), which was relied upon
as the basis for the judgmentday rule. The Godfrey case was decided before the Hoppe
case and seems to have been overruled by Kantor v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 222 App. Div.
502, 226 N.Y. Supp. 583 (1st Dep't 1928), decided by the same department after the
Hoppe case.
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basic rules applied by the federal courts in contract cases, while bearing in mind the
basic purpose of an award of damages in a tort case: to put the injured party in
the same position he was in before the tort was committed.
The reasoning of the breach day rule as applied by the federal courts is that, since
the plaintiff had a claim at the time of the breach, he is entitled to be compensated
so that he will be put into the position he was in at the time the breach occurred.
On the other hand, the judgment day rule operates on the idea that the right created
is a foreign right' 0 and that the courts of this country should not enlarge the obli-
gation of the defendant merely because the right is enforced in the courts of this
country; hence, the forum judgment should be for an amount just equal to that
which would have been rendered under the foreign law. The application of the above
rules of damages in contract cases may be appreciated by an examination of some
possible tort situations: (1) tort committed in forum, damages measured in foreign
currency; (2) tort occurring in foreign country, damages measured in currency of
American forum; (3) tort committed in one foreign country, damages measured in
the currency of another, and action brought in American forum; (4) tort occurring
on the high seas; (5) tort committed in foreign country, but the tort-feasor can
only be sued in an American forum; and (6) tort committed in foreign country,
damages measured in foreign currency and suit brought in an American forum.
The first of the above situations was involved in Th Verdi,'1 in which suit was
brought in this country on a collision in the New York harbor but vhere the repairs
were made in England and paid for in pounds sterling and included as a portion of
the provable loss. The equivalent of the breach day rule was applied, i.e., the rate
of exchange obtaining at the date the tort was committed. The court sought to
ascertain in dollars the amount of loss expressed by the foreign currency and to do
this it converted the repair bills expressed in pounds sterling into American currency
as of an agreed date.'2
10. This approach as to the right being of foreign origin has been criticized in Guines
et a. v. Mliller et al., 291 Fed. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). See also McCoLrmcn, D,%AGEs
201-2 (1935).
11. 268 Fed. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
12. It was stated by the court in The Verdi, supra note 11, at 909: "The libellant under
this method of adjustment was entitled to the payment in New York on January 1, 1916,
of the number of dollars represented by £8,269. We are not seeking the equivalent of
£8,269 in dollars, in order to replace that number of pounds in England, but are ascertaining
what was the damage on January 1, 1916, in dollars represented by £8,269. That can only
be calculated at $4.74 for each pound sterling, the then rate of exchange. Nothing lss
can indemnify the libellant for the damages suffered in New York, payment of which was
due here when ascertained.
"It is contended that the damages cannot be determined until final decree, becuse the
action sounds in tort, and that the rate of exchange then prevailing should therefore be
adopted. This somewhat archaic argument, if pushed to an extreme, would bar interest
prior to the date of the decree. The parties, however, have selected January 1, 1916, as the
date to fix the amount of their damages in pounds sterling. The case is not one of trans-
mitting these pounds sterling to New York, but of finding their equivalent in dollars on
January 1, 1916. This can only be done by employing the rate of exchange prevalent at
that date. The matter is quite different from one of a continuing obligation to pay pounds
sterling in England, the failure to perform which would be compensated for by interest.
Here the obligation was to pay dollars in New York. Failure to pay them is similarly
compensated for by interest, but as the initial damages were calculated in pounds they must
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In the second of the suggested factual situations, where a collision occurs in a
foreign country, but the damaged vessel is repaired in the United States and the bill
for said repairs is paid in United States currency, a conversion would not be neces-
sary as the court would be able to decree an award for the damage suffered in its
own currency. This was the situation involved in the principal case except for the
fact that the repair bill was not paid in American currency. The court in the principal
case suggests that if such had been the situation, a different result might have been
reached.' 3
The third situation would be one where, for example, the collision occurs in the
territorial waters of B'elgium between two foreign vessels, repairs are made in
Brazilian ports and paid in Brazilian currency and the action is brought in the local
forum. In such a case, the rationale behind the judgment day rule can best be seen.
The wronged party, during a period of falling exchange rates, should not benefit by
reason of the extraneous fact that he happens to sue in our forum. The local courts
would best deal with a problem of this type by applying the reasoning behind the
judgment day rule to the case so that the debtor's obligation will not be increased
merely by the chance that he happens to be sued in the local forum.
In the fourth suggested situation where the tort occurs on the high seas, the
weight of authority, both in England 14 and the United States, 1r is that the equivalent
of the contractual breach day rule should be applied. The suggested reason for this
is that there is no actual sovereignty over the high seas and the cause of action
attaches, in a manner of speaking, where the action is brought. Therefore, since suit
is brought in the forum, it can be considered as a suit on a right existent in the
forum, and damages in American currency will be awarded on the basis of the rate
of exchange existing at the date of the tort.
The situation where the tort is committed in a foreign country but the tort feasor
could only be sued in an American forum would be where a vessel owned by the
United States Government or one of its instrumentalities was the tort feasor and
the applicable statute, waiving sovereign immunity, provided that suit be brought in
an American court. Although, at first appearance, this would seem to be a case
clearly governed by the judgment day rule,1 it is submitted that it would be more
in the way of justice to apply the rate of exchange existing at the date of the
collision (breach day rule) because the wronged party is not trying to increase the
obligation of the tort-feasor by suing here-rather the suit is brought in the local
forum only because that is the prescribed method for the institution of a suit in
such a case. Therefore, upon the above ground or possibly on the theory that the
be converted into dollars at the value the pounds had at the time and place of payment.
That is measured by the rate of exchange then prevailing."
13. "If libellant had paid the repair bill in dollars or were still obligated to do so, It
might perhaps be arguable that libellant would be entitled to be reimbursed in that precise
'amount of dollars, i.e., $118,840.03; but we need not consider that problem, since It is
not before us here." Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, et al., 189 F. 2d
952, 958 (2d Cir. 1951).
14. Steamship Celia v. Steamship Volturno, [1921] 2 A. C. 544.
15. Quevilly-Sampson, (1938] Am. Mar. Cas. 347 (S.D. N.Y.); Hawaiian-Larchgrove,
[1935] Am. Mar. Cas. 809 (S.D.N.Y.).
16. In the MacDonough-Werfa, [1934] Am. Mar. Cas. 234 (S.D.N.Y.), involving a
collision in Australian territorial waters where the U.S.S. MacDonough was tort-feasor, the
commissioner for ascertainment of damages held the judgment day rule applicable, applying
it without taking into account the view suggested herein.
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local statute waiving immunity actually gives the right and it is a local right, the
equivalent of breach day rule should be applied.
The last of the suggested factual circumstances is substantially the same as that in
the principal case. The decision of the majority applied the judgment day rule.
Although the court did not go into the rationale of that rule,17 it would appear that
the judgment day rule would be applicable in such a case since the right enforced
was of a foreign origin, a point the court emphasizes in its opinion. This factual
situation would seem to be the converse of that in the first of the above assumed
situations and therefore, appropriately, the opposite rule is applied. In view of the
basic purpose of damages in a tort case and the fact that the right enforced here
arises in a foreign country, the method used to restore the injured party to the
position he was in prior to the commission of the tort is a judgment in dollars equiv-
alent to the amount of pounds sterling expended by the libellant.
The dissenting opinion in the principal case concentrates its argument on the basis
of the judgment day rule as announced in Deutscl Bank Filiale Nurberg v. Him-
phrey' s and states that it believes an English court, in the situation presented, would
have applied the rate of exchange on the date when the tort occurred. Such an
interpretation of the English law does not appear to be warranted in view of the
particular factual situations presented. Had this suit been brought in England, the
problem of exchange rate would not have been involved because the decree would
have been expressed in pounds sterling, the same currency in which the loss was
measured. Accordingly, the application of the judgment day rule in the principal
case gives to the libellant the same relief he would have obtained had he sued in
England, the lex loci delicti.'9
The dissent is on its strongest ground when it advances as an additional reason
for its position the fact that the case was settled before devaluation of the pound.
Possibly this should have ben controlling, since, under the facts of the case, the
17. To support its holding the majority quotes with approval the following statement
in Note, 40 HARv. L. REV. 619, 625 (1927): "Upon the commission of a tort a right arises
to damages, expressed in units of the money of the country in which the tort occurred.
These damages, primarily expressed in the'money of the foreign country, should be trans-
lated into money of the forum as of the date when the right is merged in a forum judgment.
Conversely, where a tort occurs in the forum, but where damages must be reckoned in
terms of foreign money, the right to reparation is expressed in the money of the forum
at the date the cause of action arises, and hence the rate of exchange existing on such date
should prevail." Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, et al, 189 F. 2d 952, 955
(2d Cir. 1951). The court also cites as authority for its position RmaATmrA ?, Co:.'Lscr
or LAws § 424 (1934).
18. 272 U.S. 517 (1926).
19. See Rifkind, Money As a Device for Measuring Value, 26 CoL. L. Ray. 559, 587
(1926): "In sum and substance it may then be stated that the choice of breach or
judgment day as the basic date cannot be deduced from some generally accepted principle
of damages or conflicts. It is a problem in the distribution of business los-es. For some
of the situations that arise we have ready-made answers from past experience. Many call
for careful adjustments. There can remain but little doubt that no lavyers' single-rate
Utopia will be created. Instead we have struck a domain of the law governed by standard
rather than rules." See also I[cComncr, DAmAGas 203 (1935); Fraenkel, Foreign Mo ,eys
in Domestic Courts, 35 COL. L. Rnv. 360 (1935); Drake, The Proper Rule in Fluctuating
Exchanges, 28 Mlicu. L. REv. 229 (1930); and Drake, The Rule, The Principle, the
Standard in Fluctuating Exchange, 25 M.'ci". L. Ray. 860 (1927).
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then existing rate of exchange was the basis upon which the settlement was made,
and the court might have approached the case from the standpoint of the business
world, an approach which is growing in acceptance.
DAMAGES-CONTRACTS-MEASURE OF DAMAGES WHERE OPTION TO CANCEL IS
EXERCISED PREMATURELY.-Defendant contracted to manufacture and market, at his
own expense, a toy invented by plaintiff. Under the agreement defendant was to have
production samples by January 2, 1949. Plaintiff was to receive 5 percent royalties
on the first $100,000 of net sales with a minimum for the first year, 1949, of not
less than $2,500, subject however to defendant's right to return the item not later
than April 1, 1949, after the toy show. In such event plaintiff was to receive the
5 percent royalty on all goods shipped up to April 1, 1949 and the agreement, which
otherwise was to continue for three years, subject to further renewal, would be termi-
nated. The toy show began March 7, 1949, and ran for about ten days. By January 2,
1949, the manufacturer had produced nothing and he prematurely cancelled the contract
on January 24th. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract and was awarded judgment
for $2,500, the minimum guaranteed royalty for the first year, less $150 already
given him as earnest money. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Term and
was modified on the law by the Appellate Division to an award of nominal damages.
On appeal, held, two judges dissenting, judgment of Appellate Division modified;
the damages awarded by the trial court reinstated on the ground that defendant not
only failed to produce and market the toy but also failed to exercise his option to
terminate according to the terms of the agreement. Spitz v. Lesser, 302 N. Y. 490, 99
N. E. 2d 540 (1951).
The present case involves two distinct problems in the law of damages. The first
concerns the damages to be awarded in the event of a breach of a contract for a cer-
tain duration which contains a provision permitting the defendant to terminate at an
earlier date. In the past, New York decisions' have appeared uniformly to hold that
the damages are to be for the lesser period of time, as determined by the option to
terminate, rather than for the full term of the contract. In the leading New York
case of Watson v. Russell2 a contract of employment provided that the defendant
had the right to cancel by giving the plaintiff one week's notice and one week's
additional salary. The defendant refused to allow the plaintiff to commence employ-
ment, thus anticipatorily breaching the contract. The Court of Appeals held that
the breach constituted a termination of the contract, provided for in the contract,
and limited the plaintiff's recovery to the two weeks' salary.3 In Bitterman v. Gluck,4
the court, citing the Watson case, held that discharge had the effect of notice to
terminate; consequently damages were allowed only up to the time the contract
1. Barth v. Addie, 271 N.Y. 31, 2 N.E. 2d 34 (1936); Bogy v. Balage, 265 App. Div.
249, 38 N.Y. S. 2d 584 (1st Dep't 1942); Robertson v. Charles Froham, Inc., 198 App.
Div. 782, 191 N.Y. Supp. 55 (lst Dep't 1921) ; Inglesi v. Hickson, Inc., 195 App. Div.
585, 186 N.Y. Supp. 846 (1st Dep't 1921); Dallas v. Murray, 37 Misc. 599, 75 N.Y. Supp.
1040 (N.Y. City Ct. 1902).
2. 149 N.Y. 388, 44 N.E. 161 (1896).
3. Id. at 391, 44 N.E. at 162. As the basis for its decision the court cited French v.
Brookes et al., 6 Bing. 354, 130 Eng. Rep. 1316 (1830), which held that although the
contract had not been determined in the only mode agreed on, it could not be considered
as subsisting for the whole time originally contemplated.
4. 256 App. Div. 336, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 1007 (1st Dep't 1939).
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would have terminated had notice been given. This rule has been enunciated in other
decisions not involving employment contracts.5 In Warth v. Licbovitzo the parties
agreed that the plaintiff was to install a patented machine for $450, and when the
installation was complete, the defendant was to sign a license agreement, the terms
of which were fully set out in the contract to install. Under the license agreement
the defendant was to pay a semi-annual royalty of $150 for the life of the patent,
with the right to terminate the agreement at any time by returning the machine and
paying all royalties then due. Defendant attempted to cancel the entire agreement
by returning the machine before installation was complete. This constituted a breach
since the defendant's right to cancel was not to arise until after the installation was
complete and the second contract, containing the right to terminate, was entered into.
In treating the agreement as two separate contracts, the court held that the plaintiff
had lost the value of the second contract. In determining this value, the court, citing
the Watson case, held that since the defendant had reserved the right to terminate,
his liability was clearly limited by that express condition of the contract. Accordingly,
the court awarded the plaintiff $450, the damages due for the installation of the
machine, but limited the damages under the second contract to $150, the stipulated
royalty for the first semi-annual period. 7
The rationale of the law of damages in contract cases-to leave the plaintiff in
no worse and to place him in no better position than he would have been in had
the default not been committed 8-appears to justify these decisions that thus limit
the defendant's liability where the contract contains an option to terminate. In these
cases, the courts realistically view the value of the contract as limited by the option
to terminate.9 It is fundamental that the compensation of a party complaining of
a breach of contract should be the value of the contract to him. Having been
deprived of his contract he should have its value, nothing more, nothing less.'0
Manifestly, in evaluating that contract all its provisions are to be considered; those
unfavorable as well as those favorable." An option to terminate should be con-
5. See e.g., Custen v. Robinson et al., 180 App. Div. 384, 167 N.Y. Supp. 1013 (Ist
Dep't 1917) (contract for the manufacture of yarn into bobbins); Gallo v. Mayor el al.,
15 App. Div. 61, 44 N.Y. Supp. 143 (2d Dep't 1S97) (contract for disposal of street
refuse). See Healy et al. v. Insurance Co., S0 App. Div. 327, 330, 63 N.Y. Supp. IOSS,
1058 (1st Dep't 1900) (insurance policy containing right to terminate).
6. 179 N.Y. 200, 71 N.E. 734 (1904).
7. See Chatham Plan, Inc. v. Clinton Trust Co., 246 App. Div. 49S, 286 N.Y. Supp.
179 (lst Dep't 1936).
8. 1 SEoGwicn, DmsArEs § 30 (9th ed. 1920) ; 1 CL. -, NEWv Yorm L.W or D.AMIAGES
§ 155 (1st ed. 1925).
9. In Chevrolet Motor Co. v. McCullough Motor Co., 6 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1925),
a federal court took such a view, holding that where a contract is subject to cancellation
damages cannot be measured by what plaintiff would have earned if the contract had
been carried out for the full period thereof. There is at least language to indicate that
Massachusetts may follow a contrary view. See e.g., Eastern Paper & Box Co. v. Hurtz
Manufacturing Co., 323 Mass. 138, 80 N.E. 2d 484 (1948); Orbach v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 233 Mass. 281, 123 N.E. 669 (1919).
10. Orester v. Dayton Rubber Manufacturing Co., 228 N.Y. 134, 126 N.E. 510 (1920);
Wakeman et al. v. Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Co., 101 N.Y. 205, 4 N.E. 264 (1886);
Taylor v. Bradley, 39 N.Y. 129 (1868).
11. 1 CLUp, Naw YoRE- LAw Or Dsar. ms § 155 (Ist ed. 1925).
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sidered; 12 and, until the decision in the instant case, it would appear that the courts
of New York would take such an option into consideration.
In the instant case the two dissenting judges based their opinion on the per curiam
opinion of the Appellate Division' 3 which held, citing the Watson case and what
appears to have been the law of New York, that the damages must be measured
subject to the right of cancellation, since the notice of election to terminate the
contract, though premature, was nevertheless effective to advise the plaintiff of the
defendant's intention to exercise his option. Such a repudiation should amount to
a cancellation in contemplation of law. The majority of the court made no attempt
to distinguish apparently contrary decisions in earlier and similar cases. The greater
number of such contrary decisions appear in employment contract cases and it might
be argued that they are distinguishable upon the ground that in those cases the
defendant had the right to cancel the contract at any time, but by use of a certain
method, i.e., by giving a specified period of notice. In these decisions the courts
looked upon the act of discharge as constituting the'giving of the required notice.
In the instant case, the defendant attempted to exercise his option to cancel at a
time when he had no right to do so. This appears, however, to be a distinction
without a difference.14
It is difficult to see how Warth v. Liebowitz'5 can be reconciled with the decision
of the majority in the principal case. Here the plaintiff, by the terms of the agree-
ment, had no right to the $2,500 minimum until after April 1. Had the defendant
fully performed the contract by rightfully exercising his option to terminate, the
12. "While ordinarily the value of a repudiated contract is to be determined as of the
time of the breach, in estimating what would be the prospective profits and consequent
value of the contract, its liability to be terminated while in the course of performance,
in case of certain contingencies, should, it would seem, be taken into consideration," Ibid.
(italics supplied).
13. Spitz v. Lesser, 277 App. Div. 415, 100 N.Y. S. 2d 558 (1st Dep't 1950).
14. Whether the defendant's conduct indicating an intention to be finished with the
contract takes the form of an anticipatory breach or a cancellation in accordance with
the terms of the contract would appear to be immaterial. In Orbach v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 233 Mass. 281, 123 N.E. 669 (1919), the court argued that a jury might be per-
mitted to find that, had the defendant not repudiated the contract, he might still have not
exercised the option to cancel. The unsoundness of such a conclusion has been demon-
strated in the language of the court in Chatham Plan, Inc. v. Clinton Trust Co., 246 App.
Div. 498, 286 N.Y. Supp. 179 (1st Dep't 1936), where the court said: "The claim is that
if the defendant had refused to proceed with the contract by electing to terminate, It
would not be liable, but that different consequences follow because the defendant refused
to recognize its existence. The realist must at once feel, even if he does not see, that there
is something wrong in such a paradox, especially when it is considered that the consequences
to the plaintiff of a refusal to recognize the contract were exactly the same as an election
to terminate. The reasons for the defendant's refusal to perform are not important. What
is important is that the defendant gave notice to the plaintiff that it would not undertake
to act as trustee and that concededly it had that right. It is the settled rule that damages
for the refusal to perform a contract which is terminable on specified conditions are limited
to the amount which the defendant would have been required to pay upon an election
to terminate. (Watson v. Russell, 149 N.Y. 388; Warth v. Liebovits, 179 id. 200; Robert-
son v. Frohman, Inc., 198 App. Div. 782; French v. Brookes, 6 Bing. 354; Derry v. Board
of Education, 102 Mich. 631, 61 N.W. 61.)" Id. at 500, 286 N.Y. Supp. at 181.
15. 179 N.Y. 200, 71 N.E. 734 (1904).
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value of the agreement to the plaintiff would have been 5 percent royalties on all
goods shipped up to April 1. Thus it appears that the court, by giving the plaintiff
the minimum guaranteed royalty for the first year, has put him in a better position
than he bargained for under the contract. The plaintiff received the amount of
damages he would have received had the defendant reserved no right to terminate.
Under the court's interpretation of the agreement in the instant case the damages
are not to be limited by the unexercised option to terminate. Such damages, therefore,
presumably include the full three year term of the contract. Under this view, another
question arises: has the plaintiff proved his damages with reasonable certainty as
the law requires? 6 Since the agreement of the parties fixed the sum of $2,500 as
the minimum guaranteed royalty to be paid for the first year had the contract been
performed, the plaintiff, under the majority's view is certainly entitled to receive
at least that amount in damages for a breach of contract. Although the plaintiff is
bound to prove his damages with reasonable certainty, this standard does not mean
that he can recover nothing unless he establishes the total amount of his harm.'7
The fact that there was a period of time covered by the contract for which the
plaintiff was unable to prove damages with the required degree of certainty did not
preclude him from recovering the lesser amount which he had so proved. However,
the court, in reaching its decision, cited with approval Bigelow et al. v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Iiw.,' s where the Supreme Court of the United States held that since it was
the defendant's own wrong which had rendered it impossible for plaintiff to prove
his damages with more certainty he could not complain of the alleged uncertainty.10
It is unfortunate that the court chose to express itself in this manner, for such a
statement of the rule of certainty was unnecessary to the decision in the instant
case. The lenient federal rule as applied usually in the anti-trust cases would seem
applicable only in a case where the damages are extremely difficult, if not impossible
of proof, with anything approaching mathematical certainty. Since the minimum
royalties, as awarded by the court in the instant case, were fixed by the agreement
between the parties, they were capable of fairly exact measurement, and the apparent
application of the federal rule was unnecessary.20
16. See Broadway Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 225 N.Y. 104, 121 N.E. 756
(1919) ; Cramer etal. v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 223 N.Y. 63, 119 N.E. 227 (1918) ;
Hooper et al. v. Story et a!., 155 N.Y. 171, 49 N. E. 773 (1898) ; Wakeman et al. v. Wilson
M'f'g. Co., 101 N.Y. 205, 4 N.E. 264 (1886); Griffin v. Colver et a., 16 N.Y. 489
(1858); Camera v. Schmeling, 236 App. Div. 460, 260 N.Y. Supp. 82 (1st Dep't 1932).
17. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Hachmeister Lind Co. et al., 320 Pa. 233, 181 At. 787
(1935); Gagnon v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 206 Mass. 547, 92 N.E. 761 (1910). See
also 1 REsTATEmSENT, CosTRAcs §331 a (1932).
18. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
19. See Spitz v. Lesser, 302 N.Y. 490, 494, 99 N.E.2d 540, 542 (1951).
20. This well established rule (see Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Paper Co, 282
U.S. 555 (1931), and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co, 273 U.S. 359
(1927)) is not intended to hold, as the frequent quotations from such decisions might lead
one to believe, that, where the wrongdoer's conduct renders proof of damages difficult or
impossible, such proof is entirely dispensed with. Damages sustained under such circum-
stances would be purely penal and in no sense compensatory. What the rule qppears to
mean is simply that the wrongdoer is in no position to complain in such cases if his own
misconduct prevents proof of the damages with the degree of exactitude which would
otherwise be required by the standard of certainty. To this extent, and only to this
extent, is the standard of certainty relaxed.
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-WIFE'S RIGHT OF ACTION FOR Loss OF CONSORTIUM DUv
To NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT.-Plaintiff's husband suffered personal injuries alleged
to have been sustained while a passenger on a railroad train. Plaintiff sued the trustees
of the railroad alleging in her cause of action that she had been deprived of her
husband's consortium as a result of defendant's negligence. Defendant Draper made
a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that a wife may not maintain an
action for loss of consortium due to negligence. Special Term denied the motion,
Upon appeal, held, order reversed. Passalacqua et ux. v. Draper et al., 279 App.
Div. 660, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 812 (2d Dep't 1951).
The term consortium has been variously defined,1 but generally, it is deemed to
include the right of one spouse to the conjugal fellowship, company, cooperation and
aid of the other in every marital relationship. It has been referred to as a "property-
right growing out of the marriage relation .... "2
The husband's right to sue for the loss of his wife's consortium is clearly established,8
At common law, the wife was considered a servant of her husband, who had a
proprietary interest in her and was entitled to sue for the loss of her services. 4
His interest grew to be regarded as something more than this, and was called
"consortium."
At common law, however, there was no authority permitting the wife to sue for
the loss of her husband's consortium.5 Generally, two theories are offered in expla-
nation for this lack of precedent. First, that as a matter of substantive law the wife
did not have the right to sue for loss of her husband's consortium and, second, that
the wife had the substantive right but could not effectively exercise it because of the
common law procedural difficulty that a married woman was incapable of suing unless
she joined her husband in the action and the husband was then entitled to any
recovery.0
The procedural difficulty incident to coverture was abolished by the enactment of
the Married Women's Acts.7 With the position of married women thus altered, the
great majority of jurisdictions permitted the wife to maintain an action for such
willful injuries as enticement,8 criminal conversation,0 and for alienation of affections. 10
1. 1 BoUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 621 (8th ed. 1914); BLACK, LAW DicTIoNARy 408 (3d
ed. 1933).
2. Valentine v. Pollak, 95 Conn. 556, 561, 111 Atl. 869, 872 (1920).
3. Lindsey v. Kindt, 221 Ala. 169, 128 So. 143 (1930) ; Nuzzi et al. v. United States
Casualty Co., 121 N.J. L. 249, 1 A. 2d 890 (i938); Clark el ux. v. Chaisson, 7 NJ. Misc.
269, 145 Atl. 226 (Sup. Ct. 1929) ; Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. 202 (N.Y. 1867) ; Matteson
v. New York Central R.R., 35 N.Y. 487 (1866); Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 196
S.C. 230, 13 S.E. 2d 1 (1941).
4. See Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COL. L. REV. 651 (1930).
5. 16 HALSBuRY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 319 n. (c) (1911).
6. See Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889).
7. 3 VERrER, AMERICAN FAmILY LAWS §§ 149, 150 (1935).
8. Bradstreet v. Wallace, 254 Mass. 509, 150 N.E. 405 (1926) ; Bennett v. Bennett,
116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889) ; Gross v. Gross, 70 West Va. 317, 73 S.E. 961 (1912).
9. Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1921); Newsom v. Fleming,
165 Va. 89, 181 S.E. 393 (1935).
10. Parker v. Newman, 200 Ala. 103, 75 So. 479 (1917); Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1,
18 Atl. 1027 (1889) ; Rott v. Goehring, 33 N.D. 413, 157 N.W. 294 (1916). See 3 VERNIm,
AMERICAN FAmILy LAws § 158 (Supp. 1938), for a listing of the states that have enacted
statutes abolishing civil causes of action for alienation of affections and for criminal
conversation.
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In Flafndermeyer v. Cooper,"1 where defendant had willfully sold excessive quantities
of harmful drugs to the husband despite the protests of the wife, resulting in his
confinement in an asylum, and in Work v. Cam pbell,12 where defendant knowingly
made false statements concerning plaintiff's husband causing her to send him away,
recovery for loss of consortium was allowed. Despite this relaxing of the rule in the
case of intentional torts, the courts persisted in their denial of such an action when
the wrong was merely a negligent one. In Goldman v. Cohen'3 the wife sought
damages for the loss of consortium due to personal injuries suffered by her husband
as a result of the defendant's negligence. The court stated that no case was cited
where a wife recovered upon such a claim and that the absence of precedent tended
to substantiate the belief that negligence had never given rise to a cause of action
in favor of the wife.
Allowance of such an action was not firmly recognized until the recent case of
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.14 There the court rejected the overwhelming weight of
authority pointing out the incongruity of allowing a wife to recover in the case of
a willful injury while denying her the same right in the case of a negligent injury.
The court further held that the right to sue in the case of a willful injury is based
upon a legal interest in the marriage relation, and that when a legal interest has
been injured by the wrongful act of another, an action may be maintained whether
the wrong was committed intentionally or negligently.
Various reasons have been offered to explain the inconsistency in allowing recovery
where the tort was intentional but not where it was unintentional: (1) In negligence
actions the purpose of the damages is to compensate the injured party for the direct
consequences of the wrong, the injury to the wife is indirect and therefore not
compensable.1 This argument is not tenable because the husband still has his right
of action for loss of his wife's consortium due to a negligent act even though his
injury is indirect. (2) The wife's injuries are too remote to be capable of measure-
ment.16 This reasoning is inconsistent with the decisions where damages are assessed
for injuries, no more remote, which are intentionally inflicted. (3) The husband, who
is under a legal duty to support his wife, is fully compensated in his action and,
therefore, his wife indirectly recovers the value of any loss of his consortium; any
other procedure would result in a double recovery.17 The fallacy in this reasoning
is that the element of the husband's services (obligation to support) receives principal
11. 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912).
12. 164 Cal. 343, 128 Pac. 943 (1912).
13. 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1900). The court held that the husband
had a cause of action against the negligent defendant and to allow the wife a separate
action would result in a double recovery. In Maloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8 N.Y.S.2d
608 (Sup. Ct. 1938), the court stated that it would require legislation to confer upon a
wife a right of action for loss of her husband's consortium resulting from negligence.
14. 183 F. 2d 811 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950). Hipp v. E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 182 N. C. 9, 10S S. E. 318 (1921), was the first case to recognize the
wife's right of action, but the decision was overruled by Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co.,
189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
15. Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 190); Fenefi v.
N.Y. Central & H.R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
16. Stout v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. et al., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913).
17. Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co. et al., 101 Colo. 2S8, 72 P. 2d 11C (1937); Bern-
hardt et al. v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1919) ; Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336,
63 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
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emphasis, whereas the sentimental aspect of consortium (love, society and cooperation)
is slighted. Consortium exists as a unit composed of several rights. In some cases
(criminal conversation and alienation of affections), the loss of conjugal society and
affection might stand out as the sole basis of recovery. In personal injury actions,
the loss of services would probably be the predominant factor. "The law has, how-
ever, never been solicitous to distinguish between these different elements of damage
or to separate them. . "18
In reversing, the Appellate Division in the principal case cited only Landwehr v.
Barbas,19 which is distinguishable on its facts. In the Landwehr case, a wife sued for
loss of opportunity to bear children because of physical injuries sustained by her
husband as a result of defendant's negligence. The court held that she did not have
a cause of action on the ground that child-bearing is accompanied by so many
uncertainties that it could not be said that the wrong was the proximate cause of
the wife's loss of opportunity to bear children.
The Appellate Division felt that the Court of Appeals should pass upon the
question since leave to appeal was granted immediately. Under somewhat analogous
circumstances, the Court of Appeals has not hesitated to establish a right of action
in favor of the wife for loss of consortium due to alienation of affections 20 and
criminal conversation. 21 In view of present day social standards whereby husband
and wife enjoy equal rights in the marital relation, there should be no question as
to the right of a wife to maintain an action for loss of consortium due to negligence
when such a right has been established in favor of the husband. 22 If the Court of
Appeals does not give recognition to such right the Legislature should do so.
18. Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 13, 78 Atl. 582, 583 (1911).
19. 241 App. Div. 769, 270 N.Y. Supp. 534 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd without opinion, 270
N.Y. 537, 200 N.E. 306 (1936).
20. Cf. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889), in which the court
stated: "The actual injury to the wife from the loss of consortium, which is the basis of
the action, is the same as the actual injury to the husband from that cause. His right to
the conjugal society of his wife is no greater than her right to the conjugal society of her
husband. Marriage gives to each the same rights in that regard. Each is entitled to the
comfort, companionship, and affection of the other. The rights of the one and the obli-
gations of the other spring from the marriage contract, are mutual in character, and attach
to the husband as husband and to the wife as wife. Any interference with these rights,
whether of the husband or of the wife, is a violation, not only of a natural right, but
also of a legal right arising out of the marriage relation. . . .As the wrongs of the wife
are the same in principle and are caused by acts of the same nature as those of the husband,
the remedy should be the same." Id. at 590, 23 N. E. at 18.
21. Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923).
22. Subsequent to the Special Term decision in the instant case, and prior to the
reversal by the Appellate Division, three cases have appeared in the lower courts of
New York concerning a wife's right to maintain an action for loss of consortium due to
the negligence of a third party. In Romano v. Jackson, 126 N.Y.L.J. 656, col. 2
(Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 1951), Hill, J., of Queens County cited the Passalacqua decision as a
basis for denying defendant's motion to dismiss a wife's action for loss of consortium.
However, in Fischbach v. Auto Boys, Inc., 106 N.Y.S. 2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1951), a wife
was denied a right of action for loss of consortium where it appeared that her husband
had been unsuccessful in a prior action against the defendant. The court stated that a
wife's cause of action for loss of consortium is "derivative and is based entirely upon the
existence of a valid cause of action in favor of her husband against the defendant." While
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REAL PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-NECESSITY FOR A CLI Or Ricrr.--
Plaintiff sought an injunction directing removal by defendant of a small building,
fence and sidewalk which plaintiff claimed was encroaching on her property. Defendant
set up the defense of adverse possession. From 1924 until 1942 defendant was a
tenant of a lot which adjoined plaintiff's lot on the south. In the latter year,
defendant acquired the former lot by conveyance from his landlord. His deed made
no reference to plaintiff's adjoining land, on which the encroachments had been made.
Defendant, while a tenant of his predecessor in interest, had actual possession and
used the plaintiff's land for more than the period required for adverse possession.
Held, injunctive relief granted. Defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing
the defense of adverse possession, because in thus possessing he had asserted no
claim of right; the acceptance by the defendant of the deed in which no mention
of the property adversely held while he was a tenant constituted a disclaimer of
such property. Evans v. Fraiix*, 101 N.Y. S. 2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
The requirements for adverse possession are generally said to be that such pos-
session must be actual, exclusive, open and notorious, continuous and hostile,' In
addition, some states,2 including New York, have added the requirement of claim
of right in their statutes.3 If any of these requirements is lacking the possession will
not be effective to bar the legal title of the true owner 4
In the instant case defendant complied with the first four requirements for adverse
it was not necessary to pass upon the sufficiency of the complaint, the court did refer to
existing authorities as indicating that a wife does not have a cause of action for loss of
consortium. The only case cited by the court in favor of this statement is Landwehr v.
Barbas, 241 App. Div. 769, 270 N.Y. Supp. 534 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd without opinion,
270 N.Y. 537, 200 N. E. 306 (1936), which is distinguishable on its facts. Nevertheless,
this reference by the court in the Fischbazh case to existing authorities concerning a wife's
right to sue for loss of consortium is dictum, as the complaint was dismised on other grounds.
The most recent case in point is Lurie et a., v. Mammone et al, 200 Misc. 320,
107 N.Y.S. 2d 182 (Sup. Ct. 1951), where defendant moved to dismiss a wife's cause of
action for loss of consortium on the ground of insufficiency. The court in granting the
motion, placed great weight upon Maloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 603 (Sup.
Ct. 1938). The court in the Lurie case stated, "until an appellate court indicates a change
in the law applicable to this type of action the complaint must be dismissed."l 200 Misc.
320, 321, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 182, 183 (Sup. Ct. 1951). In Woods v. Lancet, 13 Lw: REP. Nvws
No. 10, p. 3 (N.Y. Dec. 11, 1951), the Court of Appeals, in reversing the Appellate
Division held that a child upon birth may recover for prenatal injuries resulting from
defendant's negligence. The court was confronted with the probler of either following
a decision handed down by it some 30 years previous, (see Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y.
220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921)), or bringing the case law of the state, on this question, "into
accord with justice." See 19 FoRD. L. REv. 108 (1950). The court in the W1oods case decided
in favor of the latter and stated, "negligence law is common law, and the common
law has been molded and changed and brought up-to-date in many another case. Our
court said, long ago, that it had not only the right, but the duty to reexamine a question
where justice demands it."
1. Holtzman v. Douglas, 168 U.S. 278 (1897); Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 212 Ill. 624,
10 N.E.2d 917 (1937); Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N.Y. 296, 127 N.E. 239 (1920).
2. Among these are California, Florida, Montana and Utah.
3. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Act §§39, 40. See also Belotti v. Bichardt, 228 N.Y. 295
127 N.E. 239 (1920).
4. Doherty et al. v. Matsell et al., 119 N.Y. 646, 23 N.E. 994 (1890).
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possession but failed in his defense because he had not expressly asserted a claim of
right. Early New York cases held that an entry which did not appear to be hostile
was presumed to be an entry under the title of the true owner, and to overcome
this presumption the burden was on the adverse possessor to show a claim of title
or right inconsistent with that of the true owner.6 In these cases the quo animo of
the adverse claimant was looked upon as being just as important as his actual
physical possession. But later New York decisions have interpreted the claim of
right as set out in the statute to mean a continued possession for the required period
by exercising acts of ownership over the property from which a claim of right could
be implied.7 In the leading case of Momnot et al. v. Murphy,8 the New York Court
of Appeals stated that the possession which is required is established by actual, open
and notorious use and enjoyment of the property as an owner would use and enjoy
it, without any other proof of claim of title.0 This is in harmony with the interpre-
tation of claim of right as is seen in the majority of jurisdictions.1o
Even when the land is occupied through a mistake, adverse possession may still
ripen into a prescriptive right after the required number of years of possession, the
actual occupation and improvement being sufficient evdence of the intention to hold
adversely. 1 Thus in Smith v. Egan'2 where a small triangle of land covered by the
5. Ramapo Manufacturing Co. v. Mapes, 216 N.Y. 362, 110 N.E. 772 (1915) (in the
absence of a statutory requirement the bona fides of the claim of the occupant is not
essential). See also Smith v. Burtis, 9 Johns. 174 (N.Y. 1812).
6. Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587 (N.Y. 1840); Livingston v. Peru Iron
Co., 9 Wend. 511 (N.Y. 1832).
7. Barnes v. Light, 116 N. Y. 34, 22 N.E. 441 (1889). In this case there was no evidence
of any oral claim of title but each grantee actually occupied and improved the land in
controversy although it was not included in his conveyance. The court said, "A claim of
title may be made by acts alone, quite as effectively as by the most emphatic assertions."
Id. at 39, 22 N.E. at 442. See La Frombois v. Smith, 8 Cow. 589, 603 (N.Y. 1826),
where the court wrote: "The actual possession and improvement of the premises, as owners
are accustomed to possess and improve their estate, without any payment of rent, or
recognition of title in another, or disavowal of title in himself, will, in the absence of all
other evidence, be sufficient to raise a presumption of his entry and holding as absolute
owner; and unless rebutted by other evidence, will establish the fact of a claim of title."
See also Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N.Y. 296, 127 N.E. 239 (1920).
8. 207 N.Y. 240, 100 N.E. 742 (1913).
9. An exception has been made to this interpretation in cases where the adverse claimant
has affirmatively disclaimed to the true owner any intent to claim title and the owner,
in reliance upon such disaffirmance, fails to protect his interest. In such a case the claimant
is estopped by his own disclaimer from thereafter setting up title by adverse possession.
La Frombois v. Smith, 8 Cow. 589 (N.Y. 1826) ; I Txr ,'N, REAL PROPERTY § 1147 (3d ed.
1939); WA.sHr, REALr PROPERTY § 18 (1947). However in the principal case there are no
facts to show that defendant ever made such disclaimer -upon which plaintiff relied to
her detriment.
10. Guaranty Title & Trust Corp. v. United States, 264 U.S. 200 (1924), which stated
that claim of right means nothing more than the intention of the disselsor to appropriate
and use the land as his own to the exclusion of others. See also Abel et al. v. Love et al.,
81 Ind. App. 328, 143 N.E. 515 (1924) ; Rupley v. Fraser et al., 132 Minn. 311, 156 N. W.
350 (1916); Rude v. Marshall, 54 Mont. 27, 166 Pac. 298 (1917).
11. In Eggler v. New York Central R.R., 207 App Div. 120, 201 N.Y. Supp. 619
(4th Dep't 1923), the adverse claimants testified that in occupying the property they
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encroaching portion of a shed was claimed to have been held adversely the court said,
"... even where the possession by A. of the land of B. is by mistake or through
inadvertence, if A. had possessed, used, and improved the land as owners are accus-
tomed to do. . .or has, by the erection of a building, possessed it by actual visible
physical occupation... such possession, without anything more, may be said to have
been hostile and under claim of right. B. is charged with notice by the visible
physical fact alone."' 3
The second reason for defendant's failure in his action was the finding of a dis-
claimer in his acceptance of a deed in which no mention was made of the property
adversely held. Several problems arise in this connection. Where the landlord places
a tenant or a series of tenants on the property of a third party, the view is generally
accepted that the tenant's possession inures to the benefit of the landlord.' 4 Such
possession by the tenant or tenants may be used in determining the total period of
adverse possession by the landlord as there is sufficient privity of estate to tack their
possessions.15 Further, where the landlord leased property which he owned, and the
tenant, without the knowledge or consent of the landlord, took possession of and
held adversely land outside of the leasehold which belonged to a third party, the old
English cases'0 held that a presumption arose that the inclosure was made part of his
holding and inured to the benefit of the landlord. After the statute of limitations
had run the tenant was entitled to the interest in the land adversely held for the
balance of the term of his lease and only upon the termination of the lease was he
required to surrender the adversely held land to the reversioner.
Although the later English case of Wheaton v. Maple'7 indicated that a tenant
assumed that they were within the line of their own property. Appellants claimed that
such testimony showed that they were acting under a mistake and hence that there could
have been no hostile intent to claim the lands as their own. The court held that the
contention was without merit. In Crary v. Goodman, 22 N.Y. 170 (1860), the court said
that ".. . where a grantee, in taking possession under his deed, goes unintentionally and
by mistake beyond his proper boundaries, and enters upon and actually occupies and im-
proves lands not included in the deed, claiming and supposing it to be his, this occupation
is deemed to be adverse within the meaning of the statute of limitations, and if continued
for twenty years will bar the right of the owner." Id. at 174.
12. 225 App. Div. 586, 233 N.Y. Supp. 582 (4th Dep't 1929).
13. Id. at 586, 233 N.Y. Supp. at 583. In the situation where the adverse claimant
takes possession of property believing title to be in one person when in fact it is in another,
a few states have held that such possession is not adverse to the true owner, either on
the ground that the adverse claimant has not asserted a claim of right or becaus. his claim
is not adverse to the whole world. Altschul v. O'Neill, 35 Ore. 202, 58 Pac. 95 (1899);
Skansi et ux. v. Noval et al., 84 Wash. 39, 146 Pac. 160 (1915). However the majority
view is that the statute of limitations runs against the true owner and he is not excused
from protecting his interests merely because the adverse claimant asserts that title is in
someone else. Blumer v. Iowa R. Land Co., 129 Iowa 32, 105 N.WV. 342 (190s); Wood
et al. v. Bapp et al., 41 S.D. 195, 169 N.W. 518 (1918).
14. Kelly v. Green et a!., 142 Minn. 82, 170 NAV. 922 (1919); Attorney General v
Ellis, 198 Mass. 91, 84 N.E. 430 (1908).
15. Landon et al. v. Townshend et a!., 129 N.Y. 166, 29 N.E. 71 (1891); Ransey v.
Glenny et a., 45 Minn. 401, 48 N.W. 322 (1891).
16. Andrews v. Hailes, 2 E. & B. 349, 118 Eng. Rep. 797 (1853); Doe dem. Lewis v.
Rees, 6 C. & P. 610, 172 Eng. Rep. 1386 (1834); Earl of Lisburne v. Davies, L.R. 1 C.P.
260 (1866).
17. [18931 3 Ch. 48. Here the question was whether the plaintiff was entitled to an
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for years could not obtain prescriptive rights even for the benefit of his landlord,
nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals, in accord with the early English
decisions, stated the law to be otherwise in the case of Dempsey et al. v. Kipp.18
While the court may, therefore, be justified in its position that the defendant did
not by his possession acquire for himself title to the land in question, it should be
noted, however, that the mentioned English cases hold that this rule, i.e., that the
tenant acquires title for the benefit of the landlord, is in the nature of a presumption
which may be rebutted by showing acts on the part of the tenant at the time the
encroachment was made sufficient to indicate an intention to hold for himself, This
position has found approval with the New York Court of Appeals.19
There are, unfortunately, no facts given in the principal case concerning the
circumstances under which defendant or his predecessors in interest encroached on
plaintiff's property. Hence it may well be that sufficient acts were exercised by the
defendant at the time the encroachments were made to show an intention to hold
easement of light and air over defendant's land. The court said: "The whole theory of
prescription at common law is against presuming any grant or covenant not to interrupt,
by or with anyone except an owner in fee. A right claimed by prescription must be
claimed as appendant or appurtenant to the land and not as annexed to it for a term
of years." Id. at 63. It is true that this case involved prescriptive rights rather than adverse
possession but the same rules apply to both doctrines with the exception of exclusiveness
in adverse possession.
In some states the rule has been followed that possession by a tenant of land not covered
by his lease does not inure to the benefit of the landlord even though the tenant believes
he is occupying only the land demised. Holmes v. Turner Falls Lumber Co. et al, 150 Mass.
535, 23 N.E. 305 (1890); West v. Price's Heirs, 25 Ky. (2 J.J. Marsh.) 380 (1829).
The tenant cannot, in these states without the direction or even the knowledge or consent
of the landlord, effect a disseisin or originate adverse possession. Deregibus v. Silberman
Furniture Co., 124 Conn. 39, 197 At. 760 (1938); Bayne v. Brown, 60 Ore. 110, 118 Pac.
282 (1911). The reason given for the rule is that if the tenant occupies land not under
the lease but as a trespasser on the land of a third party, the trespass is his and the
penalties and compensations if any are his also. The landlord in such a case cannot be
held liable for the unauthorized trespass of his tenant, and neither should he be able to claim
a benefit because of it. See Capps et al. v. Merrifield et a., 227 Mich. 194, 198 N.W. 918
(1924), where an exception was made since the tenant had occupied for the statutory
period, both he and his landlord believing that the land adversely held was a part of the
property leased and treating it as such in their dealings with the public and adjoining
land owners. Held that the tenant's possession did inure to the benefit of the landlord.
18. 61 N.Y. 462 (1875). WOOD, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 179 (1881), states the rule
that if a tenant incloses land whether adjacent to, or in the vicinity of the demised premises,
and whether the land is part of the waste or of the highway, or belongs to the landlord
or some third person, the presumption at the end of the term is, that the inclosure Is part
of the holding and was made for the benefit of the landlord. Several other courts have
cited the rule set out in the Kipps case with approval. See Brotherhood Investment Co.
et al. v. Coal River Mining Co. et al., 46 F. 2d 976 (4th Cir. 1930); Hurt et al. v.
Schneider et al., 61 Colo. 104, 156 Pac. 600 (1916); Smith v. Denniff, 24 Mont. 20, 60
Pac. 398 (1900); Bedlow et ai., v. New York Floating Dry Dock Co., 112 N.Y. 263, 19
N. E. 800 (1889); Baird v. Erie R.R. et a., 72 Misc. 162, 129 N.Y. Supp. 329 (Sup. Ct.
1911).
19. Bedlow et al. v. New York Floating Dry Dock Co., 112 N.Y. 263, 19 N.E. 800
(1889).
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for his own benefit, and that such acts were strong enough in nature to rebut the
presumption. If the latter were true then the tenant would have acquired the fee at
the end of his term whether he purchased the reversion or not, since the statute of
limitations had already run.
It may also be ubted, in connection with the decisions requiring the tenant to
relinquish the property adversely held to the landlord at the end of the lease, that
in such cases the lease terminated naturally, whereas in the instant case there seems
to have been no termination of the lease as such but, in effect, a release to the tenant
of the reversion. If such be the case it might very well be held that the tenant's
interest never reverted to the landlord but rather remained in the tenant so that
when he purchased the reversion he became owner in fee not only of that land but
also of the land on which he had previously made the encroachments. In such a case
the failure of the landlord to mention the disputed land in the deed would have no
effect and the tenant's acceptance of such deed could not be a disclaimer of his own
interest in the property.
But even if the land adversely held did inure to the benefit of the landlord under
the presumption cited above and was not conveyed to defendant title remained in
the landlord since the statute of limitations had run and there had been the required
occupation to constitute adverse possession during the entire period. Plaintiff had,
therefore, become a stranger to the property. She had not been seised of the property
for the past twenty-seven years and no longer had such title or interest as would
entitle her to injunctive relief.2°
TORTS-RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN AcTIVE AND PASsIvE ToRT-Fzisons.--
Plaintiffs were injured as a result of the negligence of defendants Tron and Thime.
Defendant Tron paid the judgment and moved under § 211-a of the New York
Civil Practice Act to enforce contribution from Thime, the co-defendant, of one half
of the judgment. Thime contended that he was not in pari delicto, but was only
passively negligent, the defendant Tron being the active tort-feasor and, therefore,
that he need not contribute under § 211-a. The court granted the motion holding
that, whatever the relations between the joint tor-feasors, the moving defendant had
an absolute right to contribution under § 211-a. Tron et aL, v. Thime et aL,
Misc. 2d -, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 546 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
At common law contribution between joint tort-feasors was not enforcible in law
or equity.' Therefore, if a defendant paid a joint judgment against a number of
other defendants, the latter could legally disregard their moral obligation to the
paying defendant even though they were equally guilty of actual responsibility for
the tortious event successfully sued upon. Recognizing the harshness of that rule,
the New York Legislature enacted § 211-a of the Civil Practice Act which provided
that such contribution could be had, under certain circumstances, in an action for
personal injury or property damage. 2
20. Thomas et al. v. Morgan et al., 113 Okla. 212, 240 Pac. 739 (1925), in which it
was -aid: "Complainant must have title to property or some interest therein before an
injunction will be granted at his instance to protect it, and he must stand on the strength
of his own right or title, rather than on the weakness of the right and title claimed by
his opponent." Id. at 214, 240 Pac. at 736.
1. Ward v. Iroquois Gas Corp. et al., 258 N.Y. 124, 179 N.E. 317 (1932).
2. Cf. N.Y. Laws 1928, c. 714: 'Where a money judgment has been recovered
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The court in the principal case has interpreted this section to mean that even an
actively negligent defendant is entitled, under § 211-a, to contribution from a passively
negligent co-defendant. The court relies entirely upon the decision in Neenan v
Woodside Astoria Transportation Co. et al.3 In that case one Huppmann, the owner
and operator of an automobile, had sued the transportation company and had recovered
a judgment based upon the latter's negligence. Later, in a separate action, Neenan,
a passenger in the transportation company bus, recovered a judgment against both
Huppmann and the transportation company. The Court of Appeals pointed out
that Huppmann's judgment against the transportation company was properly excluded
as evidence in this latter action since Neenan, not being a party to that action, the
matter was not res adjudicata as to her. The transportation company paid the
judgment and sought contribution from Huppmann under § 211-a. Admitting that
as between Huppmann and the transportation company, the former was guilty of no
negligence, the court took the position that since Huppmann was a valid co-defendant,
the actively negligent defendant could obtain a pro rata share from him. Any
inconsistency was termed "more apparent than real."4
The decisions in the Neenan case and the instant case illustrate a mechanically
strict interpretation of § 211-a. In the Neenan case the court attempted to give
further support to its holding by pointing out that the paying defendant recovered on
the theory of subrogation, thereby partially enforcing a right always existing in the
plaintiff.5 But subrogation is an equitable doctrine whereby one, usually a surety or
one similarly situated, who under the compulsion of necessity, or for the protection
of his own interest, has discharged a debt for which another is principally liable, is
substituted in place of the payee.0 Under the facts of the Neenan and the principal
cases, the paying defendant was actively negligent and, therefore, was not equitably
entitled to subrogation, being in reality the principal, not the surety.7
In Martindale v. Griffin et al.,8 the three defendants were a car owner, the driver
of that car and an owner-driver of a second car. Only the drivers were actively
negligent. The owner-driver of the second car paid one half of the judgment and then
moved under § 211-a for contribution contending that his pro rata share was only
one third of the judgment, the other two defendants each owing a one third pro
jointly against two or more defendants in an action for a personal injury or for property
damage, and such judgment has been paid in part or in full by one or more of such
defendants, each defendant who has paid more than his own pro rata share shall be
.entitled to contribution from the other defendants with respect to the excess so paid over
and above the pro rata share of the defendant or defendants making such payment;
provided, however, that no defendant shall be compelled to pay to any other such
defendant an amount greater than his pro rata share of the entire judgment. Such recovery
may be had in a separate action; or where the parties have appeared in the original action
a judgment may be entered by one such defendant against the other by motion on notice."
3. 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744 (1933).
4. Id. at 164, 184 N.E. at 746.
5. Ibid.
6. Gerseta Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co., 241 N.Y. 418, 150 N.E. 501 (1926), rev'g,
212 App. Div. 12, 208 N.Y. Supp. 221 (1st Dep't 1925); Mansfield v. Mayor et al., 165
N.Y. 208, 58 N.E. 889 (1900); Marsh v. Pike et al., 10 Paige 595 (N.Y. 1844). See also
RESrATEMENT, SECURITY § 141 (1941).
7. Kramer et al., v. Morgan, 85 F. 2d 96 (2d Cir. 1936).
8. 233 App. Div. 510, 253 N.Y. Supp. 578 (4th Dep't 1931), atf'd 259 N.Y. 530,
182 N.E. 167 (1932).
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rata share. The court rejected the contention as being a "narrow and literal construe-
tion"9 of § 211-a. The liability of the owner and the driver of the first car was
held to be "consolidated or unified" and thus the total number of defendants did not
determine the pro rata share to be contributed, such a determination involving more
than a mere mechanical interpretation of the statute.10 The issue of the respective
rights of the passively negligent owner and the actively negligent driver of his car,
as to each other, was not involved and, therefore, the exact point of the Neenatt and
the principal cases was not determined. However, the decision in the Martindale case
did accentuate the vital distinctions between active and passive negligence and
illustrates the fact that such distinctions do come into play in the interpretation of
§ 211-a.
While at common law there was no contribution between joint tort-feasors,
indemnity against the principal wrongdoer had always been granted to one less
culpable, although both were equally liable to the person injured. This results
merely from a recognition of the fact that, as to the actively negligent tort-feasor,
the passively negligent tort-feasor is in the position of a surety.1 ' In Scott v. Curtis
et al.,12 when it was suggested that the court should not interfere as between joint
tort-feasors, the court pointed out that such was not the rule where the negligence
of one defendant was not active, as was the other's.13 Recovery over in such a case
does not offend the rule in pari delicto potior est conditio dejendentis because the
parties are not in pari delicto.24 Scott v. Curtis has been followed in numerous
decisions.15
The distinction between the right of contribution between active joint tort-feasors
and indemnity awarded to a passive tort-feasor against an active tort-feasor is
brought out clearly in Birchall v. Clemons Realty Co. et al.,1 where a defendant, to
avoid multiplicity of suit and in accordance with the provisions of § 264 of the
Civil Practice Act, set up in its answer a crossclaim against three other defendants,
alleging that if plaintiff recovered, the liability was caused solely by their, not his,
9. 233 App. Div. at 512, 253 N.Y. Supp. at 580.
10. Cf. Wold et al. v. Grozalsky et al., 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E. 2d 437 (1938).
11. See Campbell, Non-Consensual Suretyship, 45 YALE L.J. 69, 85-96 (1935). See
also 4 Wn=LsTo., Co-NTRAcTs § 1211 (4th ed. 1936).
12. 195 N.Y. 424, 88 N.E. 794 (1909). See also Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905) ; Horrabin v. Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 199 N. W. 988
(1924). For a further discussion of the point see 38 A.L.R. S66 (1925).
13. Scott v. Curtiss et al., 195 N.Y. 424, 428, 88 N.E. 794, 795 (1909), citing Phoenix
Bridge Co. v. Creem et a., 102 App. Div. 354, 92 N.Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dep't 1905),
a.f'd without opinion, 185 N.Y. 580, 78 N.E. 1110 (1906), and Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt
Paving Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 67 N.E. 439 (1903).
14. Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Creem et a., 102 App. Div. 354, 92 N.Y. Supp. 855 (2d
Dep't 1905), aff'd without opinion, 185 N.Y. 580, 78 N.E. 1110 (1906). In this case the
court cited the leading American case of Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R. R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.)
24 (1839), for the principle that "where the offense is merely malurn prolibitur, and
does not involve any moral delinquency, it is not against the policy of the law to inquire
into the relative delinquency, and to administer justice between them, although both
parties are wrongdoers." 102 App. Div. at 357, 92 N.Y. Supp. at 857.
15. See e.g., Schwartz et al. v. Merola Bros. Construction Corp. et al., 290 N.Y. 145,
48 N.E. 2d 299 (1943) ; Tipaldi v. Riverside Memorial Chapel, el al., 273 App. Div. 414, 78
N. Y. S. 2d 12 (1st Dep't 1948) ; aff'd, 298 N.Y. 686, 82 N.E. 2d 585 (1948).
16. 241 App. Div. 286, 271 N.Y. Supp. 547 (Ist Dep't 1934).
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negligence. 17 Upholding the crossclaim, the court pointed out that it was based on
the passively negligent party's common law right of indemnity when called upon
to pay.damages caused by the active negligence of others. Section 211-a was not
involved since mere contribution from defendants equally negligent was not the basis
of the crossclaim. Section 264 was appropriately invoked since what was sought
was reimbursement for all the money paid on the judgment, not a mere pro rata
share.' s The procedural distinction between § 211-a and § 264 of the Civil Practice
Act was apparently overlooked in Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Post
& McCord'9 where the court held a motion under § 211-a inapplicable on the ground
that the party seeking relief as a passive tort-feasor had been as equally negligent
as the party he sought relief from. The facts show that what was actually sought
under § 211-a was indemnity, since a pro rata share (one half) had already been
paid by the one to whose rights plaintiff was subrogated.
Whatever confusion has arisen in the interpretation of § 211-a seems to be due
to the failure to consider the fundamental purpose of the section, i.e., the remedy of
the glaring defect in the common law whereby payment by one joint tort-feasor
in pari delicto relieved the others of all liability. While this was changed by § 211-a,
this was the only change made. 20 Nowhere does § 211-a specifically state or even
hint that the well recognized distinctions between active and passive joint tort-feasors
are to be abolished. The Legislature never apparently intended to deprive the
person guilty of only passive negligence of his common law right against the party
whose negligence was the active and primary cause. 21
The only logical interpretation of the statute is that it only provides for a means
of contribution between equally or at least actively negligent defendants. Otherwise
the contradictory situation arises, as in the principal case, whereby a person is to be
17. In Carr v. City of New York, 252 App. Div. 880, 300 N.Y. Supp. 58 (2d Dep't
1938), a crossclaim was held insufficient for not alleging the sole negligence of the cross-
claimant defendant. Sometimes the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint may be so
worded as to preclude the defendant from asserting that he is merely passively negligent and
claiming over against a co-defendant under § 264 of the Civil Practice Act or bringing
in a new third-party defendant under § 193-a of the Civil Practice Act. In Werbowsky v.
Smith et a!., - Misc. -, 106 N.Y. S. 2d 671 (Sup. Ct. 1951), the main complaint alleged
both defendants to be actively negligent and thus the court granted motions to dismiss a
third party complaint -since the claim of liability over would be precluded. See also
Wolf v. La Rosa & Sons, Inc. et al., 272 App. Div. 932, 71 N.Y. S. 2d 320 (2d Dep't 1947),
aff'd, 298 N.Y. 597, 81 N. E. 2d 329 (1948). However, in Pugni v. Lanning & Harris, Inc.
et al., 196 Misc. 335, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 21 (Sup. Ct. 1949), such a vouching in was permitted
since the complaint alleged an "amorphous cause of action" under which defendant could
be liable for only passive negligence instead of active negligence. Id. at 338, 92 N.Y.S. 2d
at 24. See also Streeter v. Smucker, - Misc. -, 107 N.Y. S. 2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
18. See note 16 supra, and Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantica
Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892); Kirchner v. Muller et al., 254 App. DIv.
302, 5 N.Y.S. 2d 161 (2d Dep't 1938), modified, 280 N.Y. 23, 19 N.E. 2d 665 (1939);
Lobello v. City of New York et a!., 268 App. Div. 880, 51 N.Y. S. 2d 7 (2d Dep't 1944),
aff'd, 294 N.Y. 816, 62 N.E. 2d 243 (1945).
19. 286 N.Y. 254, 36 N.E. 2d 135 (1941). See also Security Mutual Casualty Co.
v. American Ice Co., 268 App. Div. 924, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 299 (2d Dep't 1944).
20. Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines, Inc. et al., 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289
(1931).
21. Wischnie v. Dorsch et al., 296 N.Y. 257, 262, 72 N. E. 2d 700, 702 (1947).
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held accountable to the very person who alone caused liability for the both of them.
Carried to its logical extreme the decision in the principal case would mean that a
passively negligent defendant could secure on crossclaim a judgment for indeminty-
only to have a judgment for contribution then granted against him since the actively
negligent defendant will have thereby paid more than his mathematical pro rata share.
Such a result is not only illogical but is unjust and ought not to be adhered to when
a more reasonable interpretation of a statute may be given.
